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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. -u—1-2-8-8-6-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). After a hearing, the 
Director dismissed CSEA's charge against the State of New York 
(Department of Transportation) (State), which alleges, in 
relevant part,-7 that the State violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it changed its 
-^ -'Several other related allegations were also dismissed by the 
Director, but no exceptions have been filed to those aspects of 
his decision. 
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practice of using two-employee crews for snow and ice plowing by 
substituting a program of "One-Person Plowing" (OPP). 
The Director held that the State's OPP program concerned rig 
staffing, a nonmandatory subject of negotiation under many of our 
decisions, including White Plains Police Benevolent 
Association-7 (hereafter, White Plains) and International 
Association of Firefighters of the City of Newburcrh, Local 5S9-7 
(hereafter, Newburgh). In reaching his conclusion, the Director 
refused to assess whether, on the facts of this particular case, 
the State's snowplow staffing decision is mandatorily negotiable. 
The Director concluded that White Plains and Newburcfh do not 
permit an assessment of the negotiability of staffing decisions 
on a "facts-of-the-case" approach. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the Director erred in 
finding OPP to be a nonmandatory subject of negotiation because 
he should have applied a balancing test, which would weigh the 
parties' respective interests on the facts of each particular 
case. CSEA argues that, upon application of the balancing of 
interests we have used, except as to rig staffing, the 
predominant effect of OPP is upon the employees' terms and 
conditions of employment, including safety, comfort and workload, 
such that the State's rig staffing decision in this case must be 
mandatorily negotiable. 
^9 PERB f3007 (1976). 
5/10 PERB 1[3001, conf'd. 59 A.D.2d 342, 10 PERB ^7019 (3d Dep't 
1977), motion for leave to appeal denied, 43 N.Y.2d 649 (1978). 
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The State argues in response that the Director correctly 
held that the staffing of employees per piece of equipment is a 
managerial prerogative. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
decision holding OPP to be a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
CSEA's contention is that our assessment of the 
negotiability of rig staffing under White Plains and Newburgh is 
fundamentally inconsistent with our assessment of the 
negotiability of other subjects. CSEA maintains that White 
Plains and Newburgh result in a "simple labeling of an issue" 
which rejects "further evaluation", although the negotiability of 
other subjects turns on a balance of employer-employee interests 
on the facts of each particular case. White Plains and Newburgh, 
however, are not in any way inconsistent with the negotiability 
approach which we have adopted and applied in literally hundreds 
of decisions. Nevertheless, the very fact that CSEA perceives 
there to be a basic inconsistency in approach between White 
Plains and Newburgh and other cases in which negotiability is in 
issue warrants a restatement and a clarification of the analysis 
undertaken in making negotiability determinations. 
The Act requires negotiations about "terms and conditions of 
employment". In a very real sense, the determination regarding 
the negotiability of all terms and conditions of employment is 
premised upon a balancing of employer-employee interests. A very 
few subjects have been prebalanced, in effect, by the Legislature 
according to the nature of the subject matter. Certain subjects 
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are mandatory, e.g., wages and hours and, until recently, local 
government agency shop fees. Certain others are prohibited, 
e.g., retirement benefits as defined in §201.4 of the Act. A 
balance of interests on the facts of each ^articular case as to 
these subjects is quite obviously not undertaken because no 
amount of fact-based persuasion can alter the balancing 
determination which the Legislature has already made. The 
negotiability analysis is the same with respect to the vast 
majority of subjects whose negotiability has been left for 
determination by us in the first instance. A balance of 
interests is undertaken, directed again to the nature of the 
subject matter in issue. 
The "facts-of-the-case" approach advocated by CSEA is 
inconsistent with the approach of assessing negotiability 
according to the nature of the subject matter in issue. Were we 
to follow the approach advocated by CSEA, rig staffing might be 
mandatorily negotiable in one case, but a different result might 
obtain in another case involving a different employer, or even 
the same employer but a different piece of equipment. CSEA's 
argument, of course, cannot be limited to rig staffing. Under 
its argument, no subject would be nonmandatory or mandatory 
according to its nature. All negotiability determinations would 
be made on the facts of the case with as many variations in 
negotiability outcome as those differing fact patterns warranted. 
The facts-of-the-case approach to negotiability assessments would 
thus produce results which are destructive of the uniformity 
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necessary for any reasoned conduct of collective negotiations by 
the parties to a bargaining relationship or to the administration 
of a collective bargaining statute. It is simply essential for 
all parties within our jurisdiction to know with as much 
certainty as possible whether a given subject is mandatorily 
negotiable or not, even if their particular factual circumstances 
differ. Determinations regarding the scope of negotiations must 
comport with the statutory scheme having state-wide application. 
Only the type of balance typified by our rig staffing decisions, 
where we identify the nature of the subject matter in issue and 
balance employer and employee interests regarding that subject, 
can even hope to achieve a uniform scope of bargaining. 
White Plains and Newburah represent precisely the type of 
negotiability balance we believe to be both necessary and 
appropriate. The relevant employer and employee interests were 
identified in those cases, evaluated, and a conclusion was 
reached, with which we agree, that the inherent nature of any rig 
staffing decision is one which is primarily related to a 
government's mission in determining the extent and level of its 
service to the public and the manner of its delivery. 
Notwithstanding CSEA's belief and arguments to the contrary, 
our cases do not support the proposition that we have required or 
endorsed the type of fact-specific balancing sought by CSEA. 
There have been in the past, and inevitably will be in the 
future, some subjects which cannot be neatly categorized 
according to their subject nature or which are so broad that a 
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more particularized identification of the subject is necessary. 
In those areas, a more detailed fact-specific analysis may be 
required before the subject nature of the issue is revealed. The 
cases which CSEA argues typify our inconsistency of approach and 
our endorsement of a fact-specific balance of interests to 
determine negotiability are merely ones where we concluded that 
an analysis of facts was necessary before we could satisfactorily 
identify the nature of the subject matter in dispute. 
In State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services)^ (hereafter, State of New York (DOCS)), the employer 
required employees who had reported at one geographic location to 
report at a different geographic location. The proper 
characterization of the nature of the subject matter in issue was 
contested by the parties. However, we determined that what could 
perhaps be best described as a change in reporting location was 
mandatorily negotiable based upon a traditional balancing of 
employer and employee interests as to that subject. Nothing in 
that decision warrants a conclusion that we have or must examine 
and reexamine the particular factual circumstances in which every 
party finds itself before deciding the negotiability of every 
subject. State of New York (DOCS) simply represents the truism 
that some few subjects must be examined closely before an 
identification of the nature of the subject, upon which the 
negotiability analysis hinges, can be made. 
^20 PERB 53003 (1987). 
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Certain other subjects about which bargaining is often 
sought are inherently very broad. A good example is work rules. 
Work rules can and often do embrace a great variety of subject 
matters covering almost every aspect of an employment 
relationship. Many will involve nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation; many others will embrace mandatory subjects. It is, 
therefore, necessary when assessing the negotiability of a "work 
rule" to refine the analysis to identify the basic nature of the 
subject matter embraced by the given work rule. This was what 
was done in State of New York.-7 the other case cited by CSEA as 
an example of our alleged inconsistency in making negotiability 
assessments. As State of New York demonstrates, the refining 
process can occasionally involve a close examination of facts and 
this may account for any confusion there may be as to the 
appropriate negotiability approach. But whatever particularized 
examination of facts there may be in certain cases in which 
negotiability is the issue, it is only for the purpose of 
accurately identifying the nature of the subject in issue and not 
for the purpose of advancing the theory of negotiability argued 
by CSEA. 
The subject of rig staffing is neither one whose inherent 
nature is unclear nor one which lends itself of necessity to 
'^18 PERB UI3 064 (1985) . In that case, we held that a parcel 
inspection system instituted under work rule was not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. In making that determination, we 
examined the components of the system, distinguishing it from a 
different type of search system which we had held was mandatorily 
negotiable in an earlier case. 
I \ 
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subcategorization consistent with the policies of the Act. The 
Director, therefore, properly relied upon White Plains and 
Newburqh in concluding that the State's decision to reduce its 
rig staffing through its OPP program is not mandatorily 
negotiable. Of course, the mandatorily negotiable effects of 
that decision, which were necessarily occasioned by OPP, are, as 
the State concedes, subject to impact bargaining upon demand. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
/At A ^ A T-~ K/\%J[ 1 kr-Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
Eric / . Schmertz, Member > 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NASSAU COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, ... 
-and- CASE NO. U-11857 
COUNTY OF NASSAU (NASSAU COUNTY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT), 
Respondent. 
SOLOMON RICHMAN 6REENBERG P.C. (HARRY 6REENBER6 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (DANIEL E. WALL and PETER A. BEE Of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Nassau (Nassau County Police Department) (County) to a decision 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a charge filed against 
the County and its Police Department (Department) by the Nassau 
County Police Benevolent Association (PBA). The PBA alleges that 
the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally implemented drug 
testing procedures and specified the testing consequences for the 
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police officers-7 represented by the PBA and refused the PBA's 
demand to bargain alternative testing procedures and 
consequences. After a hearing, the ALJ held that the County 
violated the Act as alleged, concluding that the County's testing 
procedures and the PBA's counterproposals thereto were 
mandatorily negotiable and that the PBA had not waived its right 
to bargain those subjects. 
The County argues in its exceptions that all aspects of its 
implementation of the drug testing policy are nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation or, alternatively, that the PBA waived 
any right to bargain by its 1989-91 collective bargaining 
agreement with the County. 
The PBA argues in response that the ALJ's decision is 
correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, including those made at oral argument,-7 we affirm 
the ALJ's decision. 
The County's drug testing policy and procedures, first 
implemented in August 1990, were promulgated by Police 
Commissioner's Orders Nos. 16 and 27, dated April 7, 1989 and 
June 26, 1989, respectively. The only issues before us concern 
the County's refusal by its unilateral action to negotiate the 
-''The ALJ dismissed the charge as it pertains to applicants for 
unit positions. No exceptions have been filed to this aspect of 
the ALJ's decision. 
-
7The PBA stipulated at that time that the testing of police 
recruits assigned to the Police Academy is also not in issue. 
Board - U-11857 -3 
implementation of its drug testing program and its refusal to 
honor the PBA's demands to bargain that implementation and the 
testing consequences. The negotiability of the decision to 
subject unit employees to drug testing for substance use or abuse 
is not in issue. Accordingly, we express no opinion regarding 
the negotiability of such a decision, although we will assume for 
purposes of our analysis in this case that it is not mandatorily 
negotiable. It is also undisputed that the County did not engage 
in any negotiations with the PBA regarding any aspect of the drug 
testing policy or procedures at any time. 
Having summarized the issues, we turn to the essentials of 
the County's drug testing policy and procedure. Applicants for 
employment, recruits, and probationary police officers are 
subject to random urinalysis testing at any time. Members of the 
Narcotics Bureau, the Special Narcotics Enforcement Bureau and 
the Scientific Investigation Bureau are subject to random, 
periodic urinalysis testing. All employees who request 
assignment to these bureaus must consent in writing to random 
testing during their assignment. If the officers assigned to 
these bureaus decline to submit to random testing, they are 
immediately transferred. Any officers subject to random testing 
are selected by computer-generated serial number and remain 
eligible for any future testing at any time despite having been 
tested. All other police officers are subject to urinalysis 
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testing only on "reasonable suspicion"-7 of "drug abuse"-7 as 
those terms are defined by the County. Any officer who refuses 
to submit to a drug test is immediately suspended and is 
subjected to subsequent disciplinary action, including dismissal. 
Employees are also required to report any possible drug abusers. 
The urine samples are collected in two tubes under the 
supervision of a superior officer. One person of the same sex 
acts as an immediate observer to the collection. The employee 
must complete a form listing all medications ingested during the 
seventy-two hours preceding the test. The employee is afforded 
the right to consult with and be accompanied by a PBA 
-/Commissioner's Order No. 16 defines reasonable suspicion as 
follows: 
Reasonable suspicion that a member is abusing drugs 
exists when objective facts and observations are 
brought to the attention of a Superior Officer and 
based upon the reliability and weight of such 
information he/she can reasonably infer or suspect that 
a member of the Department is abusing drugs. 
Reasonable suspicion must be supported by specific 
articulable facts which may include, but are not 
limited to: reports and observations of the member's 
drug related activities, i.e., purchase, sale or 
possession of drugs, associations with known drug , 
dealers or users, observations of the member at known 
drug related locations, etc.; an otherwise unexplained 
change in the member's behavior or work performance; 
and observed impairment of the member's ability to 
perform his duties. 
-''commissioner's Order No. 16 defines drug abuse as follows: 
The term "drug abuse" shall include the use of a 
controlled substance or marihuana, which has not been 
legally prescribed and/or dispensed, and the improper 
or excessive use of a legally prescribed drug. 
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representative. The scheduled collection, however, may not be 
delayed if a PBA representative is not available. The tubes are 
signed and sealed after collection. An unspecified chain of 
custody is to be maintained. One sample is delivered to a 
laboratory licensed or certified by the State Department of 
Health (DOH). The other is kept by the Police Department's 
Scientific Investigation Bureau. The initial screening is by 
Enzyme Multiple Immunoassay Testing (EMIT). If that test is 
negative, no further testing is done and the second sample is 
destroyed. Positive EMIT tests are confirmed by a Gas 
Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry test at a level of detection 
specified by the DOH or 0.3 micrograms per milliliter for 
nonregulated drugs. If the second test is positive, the employee 
is notified that the second sample may, at the employee's option 
and cost, be retested at a laboratory of the employee's choice. 
Positive test results are sent to the Police Department's 
Internal Affairs Unit for a "complete investigation". If that 
investigation concludes in a finding that the employee used 
illegal drugs or abused prescribed drugs, a report of a violation 
of rules and regulations is issued to the employee. The employee 
may then obtain a copy of the laboratory results. Results are 
otherwise given to the employee "at the earliest appropriate time 
(to be determined based upon the particular facts and 
circumstances)." Negative test results are sealed and sent to 
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the Police Commissioner, who is empowered to approve the 
unsealing of any drug screening tests. 
The PBA testing proposal, submitted in response to 
Commissioner's Order No. 16, modified the County's definition of 
"drug abuse" and "reasonable suspicion", afforded the employee 
and a PBA executive board member twenty-four hour advance notice 
before any random test, subjected the random testing of persons 
assigned to the Scientific Investigation Bureau to the PBA's 
agreement to the appropriate screening level, ensured that 
personnel files do not reflect an employee's refusal to sign the 
testing acknowledgement form, required notification of test 
results within twenty-four hours of the Department's receipt of 
results and required destruction of negative test results. In 
all other major respects, the PBA's proposal is the same as 
Commissioner's Order No. 16. 
DISCUSSION 
As both parties recognize, this is a case of first 
impression for us, a circumstance which has occasioned our fairly 
detailed summary of the County's drug testing policy. Our few 
prior drug testing decisions either have involved different 
issues or have arisen under different circumstances.-7 This is 
the first time we have been required to decide whether and to 
^Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 25 PERB }[3 001 (1992) ; Metropolitan 
Suburban Bus Auth. , 20 PERB ?[3066 (1987) ; City of Buffalo, 
20 PERB ^3048 (1987) ; State of New York, 20 PERB "H3038 (1987) . 
Board - U-11857 -7 
what extent the procedures incident to a decision to subject 
employees to drug testing of any type and the consequences 
flowing from the results of such tests are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. 
In analyzing the case, we first conclude that there is a 
clear distinction between an employer's decision to drug test 
employees and the procedures used to implement that decision, 
including the consequences of the testing.-7 Accordingly, we 
reject the County's primary argument that the implementation of 
its decision to test is inseparable from the decision to test 
itself, such that if the decision to test is a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation, none of the procedures or consequences of 
"going forward" with that decision are mandatorily negotiable. 
Having made this distinction, we are faced with the basic 
question as to whether the County's implementation of its drug 
testing policy involves mandatorily negotiable subjects. The 
employer and employee interests, to be balanced in making the 
negotiability determination, are self-apparent. The County seeks 
to detect and prevent impairment of its police officers which can 
jeopardize safety and otherwise compromise the delivery of police 
-''This distinction has been specifically recognized (Fraternal 
Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461 (1987)) 
and is necessarily implicit in all of the decisions cited infra 
note 8 which hold drug testing procedures to be mandatorily 
negotiable. 
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services.-1 The County also argues that the testing maintains 
and fosters the public's confidence in its police department. On 
the other hand, it is recognized in the ever-developing case law 
that drug testing by urine sampling is a demeaning and intrusive 
procedure, which triggers personal privacy issues of 
constitutional dimension. The outcome of those tests, accurate 
or not, can affect the employee's employment in several ways, and 
may affect the employee's reputation irrevocably. We reach our 
negotiability determination with all of these interests clearly 
in mind. 
The County's interests relate only, or at least primarily, 
to the decision to subject employees to a drug test. They are 
not, however, so related to the implementation of that decision 
as to render the several separate implementation decisions 
equally nonmandatory in all respects. We cannot say that 
whatever managerial prerogatives may be associated, for example, 
with testing methodology, testing triggers (e.g., definition of 
Z/We need not and do not assess the efficacy of drug testing as a 
means of showing impairment, past or present, either on or off 
the job. We note only that the employer interests which we 
balance have been recognized by New York's Court of Appeals in a 
series of decisions involving public employers, including the 
County, upholding the constitutionality of drug testing of 
employees in safety-sensitive positions. DeLaraba v. Nassau 
County Police Dep't. 83 N.Y.2d 367 (1994); Selia v. Koehler, 
76 N.Y.2d 87 (1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 847; McKenzie v. 
Jackson. 75 N.Y.2d 995, aff'cr 152 A.D.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1989); 
Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432 (1988). None of these decisions, 
however, involved collective bargaining rights and obligations 
under the Act and the negotiability issue is distinct from the 
issue concerning the constitutionality of employee drug testing. 
See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., supra note 5. 
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reasonable suspicion), choice of laboratory, collection 
procedures, chain of custody, sample screening, conditions for 
retesting, reporting and recording of test results, due process 
protections, and disciplinary consequences, so outweigh the 
employees7 collective and individual interests in these areas as 
to make them negotiable only at the County's option. We, 
therefore, find these procedures and consequences to be 
mandatorily negotiable. 
Our holding that the implementation and consequences of the 
County's decision to drug test embrace mandatory subjects of 
bargaining places us fully in accord with several other 
jurisdictions which have considered this issue.-7 It is similarly 
in accord with decisions in New York involving the negotiability of 
implementations of management rights of varied types,-1 other 
g/Johnson-Bateman Co.. 295 NLRB No. 26, 131 LRRM 1393 (1989); 
Citv of Newark. 16 NJPER 121186 (1990), aff 'd, Case No. A-125-
90T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); Cambria County Transit Auth., 21 
PPER f21007 (1989), aff'd, 22 PPER 122056 (1991); Hollidav v. 
Citv of Modesto. 15 Cal. PERC 122090 (Calif. Ct. of Appeal 1991); 
Citv of Miami. 12 FPER fl7029 (1985) (appeal filed); Citv of New 
Haven, Decision No. 2554-A (Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations 
1987); City of Fall Riverf 20 MLC 1352 (Mass. Labor Relations 
Comm'n 1994) ; AFSCME v. 111. State Labor Relations Bd.. 190 111. 
App.3d 259, 546 N.E.2d 687, 135 LRRM 2224 (1989). 
g/Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the Citv of New York 
v. PERBf 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 17012 (1990); Schenectady PBA v. 
PERB, 196 A.D.2d 171, 27 PERB 17001 (3d Dep't 1994) (appeal 
pending); County of Yates. 21 PERB 13008 (1988); Citv of 
Schenectady. 19 PERB 13051 (1986), conf'd, 132 A.D.2d 242, 
20 PERB 17022 (3d Dep't 1987); Sackets Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist., 
13 PERB 13058 (1980). 
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forms of employee testing,—' work rules,—' and employee 
disciplinary standards and procedures.—7 Indeed, we find no 
reported decision, and none is cited to us by the parties, which 
affords a public employer the unrestricted right to decide 
unilaterally all components of a drug testing policy, as is 
asserted and was exercised by the County in this case. 
In summary, our own decisions and those cited from other 
jurisdictions lead us to conclude that the County's 
implementation of its drug testing decision and the consequences 
of that testing are not among those decisions which are or should 
be excluded from the scope of compulsory negotiation either 
because they lie at the core of managerial control, are otherwise 
fundamental to the basic direction of government, are so 
inextricably intertwined with the decision to test as to make 
bargaining concerning implementation impracticable, or impinge 
upon the employment relationship only indirectly. 
Our determination that the components of the County's drug 
testing policy are mandatorily negotiable leaves for 
^Citv of Cohoes. 25 PERB 53042 (1992) (tuberculosis testing); 
City of Saratoga Springs, 16 PERB [^3058 (1983) (employment-
related polygraph); City of Troy, 10 PERB f3 015 (1977) 
(employment-related polygraph and breathalyzer); Buffalo PBA v. 
Helsby, 9 PERB [^7020 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1976) (polygraph) . 
•^Citv of Albany v. PERB. 48 A.D.2d 998, 8 PERB f7012 (3d Dep't 
1974), aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 778, 9 PERB f7005 (1975). 
—
/Binghamton Civ. Serv. Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 
23, 11 PERB U[7508 (1978); Auburn Police Local 195 v. PERB. 62 
A.D.2d 12, 11 PERB f7003 (3d Dep't 1977), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 
12 PERB H7006 (1979). 
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consideration the County's argument that the PBA had, at most, a 
right to negotiate on an "impact" or an "effects" basis certain 
of its drug testing implementations and consequences, but it had 
waived even that right by contract with the County under which 
the County is released from any duty to negotiate "the impact of 
exercising any right authorized by law . . . ." 
The County's argument in this second respect must be 
rejected because it is premised upon a mistaken understanding of 
impact bargaining. 
A demand for impact bargaining permits negotiation about 
those mandatorily negotiable effects which are inevitably or 
necessarily caused by an employer's exercise of a managerial 
prerogative. As the concept has been developed and applied, 
impact bargaining is actually a limited exception to an 
employer's duty to negotiate all terms and conditions and to an 
employer's corollary bargaining duty to refrain from unilateral 
changes with respect to those mandatorily negotiable 
subjects.—7 We have permitted an employer to exercise the 
managerial prerogative even though the exercise of that right 
causes changes to occur in terms and conditions of employment 
because we have been persuaded that an employer cannot be denied 
the right to exercise the managerial right while it bargains the 
mandatorily negotiable effects of the managerial decision. 
Impact bargaining, therefore, is an accommodation between at 
^Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB 53086, aff'q 12 PERB 54510 (1979). 
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times conflicting rights which sacrifices, to an extent and of 
necessity, the union's right to bargain terms and conditions of 
employment. Care must be taken, therefore, to avoid an 
interpretation of impact bargaining which would greatly expand 
what is essentially a limited exception to the Act's broad and 
sweeping obligation to bargain regarding all terms and conditions 
of employment. 
As relevant here, the focus in an impact bargaining case is 
upon the degree of causation between the managerial right being 
exercised and the effects occasioned thereby. Our impact 
bargaining cases have all involved circumstances in which an 
employer has made a managerial decision, but has not taken any 
further action.—' The effects of the managerial decision were 
directly and necessarily caused by the employer's managerial 
decision without any intervening cause or decisional 
implementation. What clearly distinguishes this case from an 
impact bargaining situation is that the County's several 
implementations of its decision to drug test stem from decisions 
made separately from the decision to drug test. The County chose 
each of those implementation procedures and consequences; none 
was an inevitable, necessary or even a direct result of the 
^Citv of Schenectady, 18 PERB [^3035 (1985) ; Local 589, Int'l 
Ass'n of Firefighters. 18 PERB 5[3017 (1985), conf'd, 117 A.D.2d 
965, 19 PERB ^7007 (3d Dep't 1986), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 166, 20 PERB 
57008 (1987) ; Suffolk Co. BOCES, 17 PERB [^3048 (1984) ; East 
Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. , 17 PERB [^3001 (1984) ; Schuyler-Chemuncr-
Tiocra BOCES, 15 PERB [^3036 (1982) ; Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. 
Dist. , 15 PERB }[3032 (1982); Town of Oyster Bay, supra note 13; 
City Sch. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB [^3060 (1971) . 
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decision to test. In an impact bargaining situation, the effects 
which are sought to be bargained simply flow from the exercise of 
managerial prerogative without benefit of or need for any 
separate decisional implementation. For example, in Town of 
Oyster Bay—/ it was an increase in hours caused directly by the 
Town's managerial decision to collect newspapers for recycling by 
sorting those newspapers into separate racks installed on the 
Town's trucks. The employer in that case did not make any 
independent decision to increase the hours of work. The 
extension of the workday was nothing more than a consequence or a 
byproduct of the managerial decision to recycle newspapers. We 
concluded, therefore, that the opportunity to negotiate the 
increase in the hours of work, plainly a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, was limited to impact bargaining upon demand. In 
stark contrast, the County's drug testing plan exists in its 
present form only because the County decided upon each component 
of it. The County, for example, could have chosen a different 
testing methodology, a different laboratory, a different 
collection procedure, and, perhaps most significantly to the 
employees, a different consequence (e.g., rehabilitation, warning 
or counseling instead of discharge) for a positive result. The 
County's drug testing procedures and consequences were not caused 
by its decision to test in the sense that would give rise to 
—
7Supra note 13. 
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impact bargaining and, therefore, its separate decisions in these 
respects were subject to a decisional bargaining obligation. 
Having determined that the PBA's rights in relevant respect 
were never in the nature of impact negotiations, the parties' 
contract clause is immaterial to the disposition of the charge. 
The contractual waiver, if any, is limited to impact bargaining, 
and it simply has no application to the decisional bargaining 
required of the County here. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the County's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County of Nassau and its 
Police Department: 
1. Rescind and cease enforcement as to unit employees of 
the drug testing procedures and consequences under 
Commissioner's Orders Nos. 16 and 27. 
2. Rescind any disciplinary action taken against any unit 
employee pursuant to Commissioner's Orders Nos. 16 or 
27 and remove and destroy all documents made and 
retained in unit employees' files which relate to the 
implementation or consequences of the policy in these 
regards. 
3. Make unit employees whole, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate, for any salary, wages or benefits lost due 
to the implementation of the testing procedures or 
consequences. 
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Negotiate with the PBA as demanded concerning the 
procedures and consequences of the drug testing policy 
set forth in Commissioner's Orders Nos. 16 and 27. 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to unit 
employees. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^ f u j , ^ JL^ |C\r\QUf U 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
Waltei Eisenberg, Membe 
/^uy^^A^^4' 
Eric Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the Nassau County Police Benevolent Association that the County of Nassau and Nassau County Police 
Department will: 
1. Rescind and cease enforcement as to unit employees of the drug testing procedures and 
consequences under Commissioner's Orders Nos. 16 and 27; 
2. Rescind any disciplinary action taken against any unit employee pursuant to Commissioner's Orders 
Nos. 16 or 27 and remove and destroy all documents made and retained in unit employees' files 
which relate to the implementation or consequences of the policy in these regards; 
3. Make unit employees whole, with interest at the maximum legal rate, for any salary, wages or 
benefits lost due to the implementation of the testing procedures or consequences; and 
4. Negotiate with the PBA as demanded concerning the procedures and consequences of the drug 
testing policy set forth in Commissioner's Orders Nos. 16 and 27. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14013 
GREAT NECK WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
KREISBERG & MAITLAND, P.C. (JEFFREY L. KREISBERG of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its charge against the Great Neck Water Pollution 
Control District (District) as untimely filed. CSEA's charge 
alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
eliminated a practice under which unit employees were given a 
supplemental workers7 compensation benefit.^7 In defense of the 
charge, the District argued that it was untimely filed because 
-''Under that practice, unit employees who were absent from work 
because of a job-related injury were paid their full wages for 
the first eight weeks of such absence. 
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the change in practice was made and communicated to CSEA no later 
than October 5, 1990, and the charge was not filed until 
November 9, 1992, shortly after a unit employee was first denied 
the supplemental benefit for a job-related injury. 
The ALT reserved decision on the District's motion to 
dismiss the charge until after the hearing, at which time she 
granted it. She held that the change, effective immediately by 
its terms, was made and communicated to CSEA no later than early 
October 1990, and that the record did not support CSEA's 
contention that the change had been rescinded or tabled pending 
negotiations. 
The parties' arguments to us on appeal are the same as those 
to the ALJ. The material facts on the timeliness issue are not 
in dispute. Having reviewed the record and considered the 
parties' arguments, we reverse. 
CSEA admits that it knew of the change in the supplemental 
workers' compensation benefit in early October 1990. In mid-
October 1990, CSEA's representatives met with the District's 
attorney. CSEA objected to the change at that time as a 
violation of the District's statutory duty to negotiate. 
According to the record, the District's attorney agreed with 
CSEA, ascertained whether there were any pending compensation 
claims, and told CSEA that its proposals for some modification to 
the old policy would be discussed with the District. There was, 
however, no response thereafter from the District, no follow-up 
by CSEA and no discussion of the issue in negotiations for a new 
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collective bargaining agreement. The parties7 failure to 
continue their discussions on the subject, however, is immaterial 
to our determination that the charge is timely because the 
failure was mutual and occurred in a circumstance in which CSEA 
had no greater burden to pursue the issue than did the District. 
The record provides clear evidence that the reason CSEA did 
not file a charge in response to the change in policy was because 
it believed after the meeting with the District's attorney that 
the policy had either been rescinded or tabled. Its immediate 
opposition to the announced change is irreconcilable with any 
other conclusion. Its belief in that respect, however, is not by 
itself sufficient to make its charge timely. The pertinent 
inquiry is whether that belief is reasonably attributable to 
statements and/or actions by the District. In that respect, we 
are persuaded that this case is much like County of Onondaga,-7 
where we held a charge, otherwise untimely, to have been timely 
filed because the employer had led the union to believe that a 
change in practice was not necessarily final. In that case, we 
concluded that statements by the employer led the union 
representatives to believe that the change was experimental and 
subject to review after a trial period. On the particular facts 
of this case, we find that the statements here were to similar 
effect. The District's representative at the only meeting with 
^12 PERB 53035 (1979), confid, 77 A.D.2d 783, 13 PERB 57011 (3d 
Dep't 1980). See also Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 25 PERB 53051 
(1992) . 
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CSEA on the issue recognized that the change should have been 
negotiated, ascertained that the policy had not yet had any 
effect on unit employees, and promised CSEA that he would discuss 
the issue with the District's officials. Whether intentionally 
or not, the District induced CSEA to refrain from filing a charge 
in the interest of cooperative labor relations, as occurred in 
County of Onondaga. CSEA's first knowledge that the announced 
policy had not been rescinded or tabled was when the District 
applied it to an injured employee in 1992. CSEA's charge was 
filed within four months of that date and it is, therefore, 
timely filed. 
There being no findings regarding the merits of the charge 
or the District's other defenses, the matter is appropriately 
remanded to the ALJ. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the ALJ for such decision as 
is necessary and appropriate. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
mline R. Kinsella; C. Paul Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member t 
^^U^OC^C-t 
Schmertz, Member 
*2o- 9/30/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF COHOES, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15003 
COHOES POLICE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (ELAYNE G. GOLD of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ROWLEY, FORREST, O'DONNELL & HITE, P.C. (BRIAN J. O'DONNELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) on a charge filed by the City 
of Cohoes (City) against the Cohoes Police Benevolent and 
Protective Association (PBA). The charge alleges that the PBA 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it submitted a nonmandatory subject of negotiation to 
compulsory interest arbitration. The demand in issue provides as 
follows: 
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ARTICLE XXI MEDICAL INSURANCE, Subdivision B 
CAfter Retirement) 
Union position: The City will provide at its cost health 
insurance coverage for the life of an employee who retires 
on or after the effective date of this Agreement and for the 
life of his or her spouse under Capital District Physicians 
Health Plan - Emerald Plan with prescription drug coverage 
including student coverage to age 25 as it exists on June 1, 
1993 or better.—The employee and his or her spouse may 
elect individual or family coverage. The obligation to 
provide coverage for dependent family members shall exist 
only as long as they are covered by the family coverage of 
the Plan. 
The employee and his or her spouse may elect to receive 
from the City monthly payments of an amount equal to the 
premium otherwise payable by the City in lieu of the health 
care coverage provided under the previous paragraph. 
On a stipulated record, the Assistant Director held that the 
demand is nonmandatory because it would apply to persons who 
retire after expiration of the contract under which the benefit 
is extended, thereby affording coverage to them for a period of 
time greater than that permitted under several of our decisions 
discussed infra. 
The PDA argues that the Assistant Director's decision is not 
required or supported by the holdings in any of the several 
decisions cited in his decision and that the demand should be 
held to be mandatorily negotiable. The City argues in response 
that the PDA's exceptions should not be considered because they 
are not in proper form, but that the Assistant Director was 
correct in finding the demand to be nonmandatory. 
Preliminarily, we find the PDA's exceptions to have been 
filed in accordance with our Rules of Procedure (Rules). The 
PDA's exceptions do not raise any new claims for the first time 
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on appeal. Its legal arguments in support of its one claim that 
the demand is mandatorily negotiable may have been clarified or 
modified in its brief to us, but the claim itself has remained 
constant throughout the processing of the charge. Our Rules and 
practice do not deny a party an opportunity to refine a legal 
theory or argument in support of a claim which has been raised 
and the City had a full opportunity to respond to the PBA's legal 
arguments in support of that claim. Similarly, the PBA's failure 
to cite to specific pages of the Assistant Director's decision is 
inconsequential. The Assistant Director's decision is less than 
four pages in length, including caption, introduction and order, 
and it contains only one rationale for finding a violation of the 
Act. The exceptions as filed clearly identify the parts of the 
decision to which the exceptions are taken and the grounds for 
those exceptions. Nothing more was required of the PBA in the 
context of this case. 
In assessing the negotiability of its demand, we are 
necessarily asked by the PBA to reexamine a prior line of cases 
because collectively, if not individually, these cases hold that 
the continuation of current employees7 health insurance after 
retirement is mandatorily negotiable only to the extent the 
continued coverage is limited to the duration of the contract 
under which the employee retires.-'' All of our decisions in 
-
XSee, e.g., New York City Transit Auth., 22 PERB f6501 
(1989) ; Incorporated Village of Garden City, 21 PERB [^3027 
(1988); City of Oneida Police Benevolent Ass'n, 15 PERB ^3096 
(1982) . 
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this respect trace to Lynbrook Police Benevolent Association-7 
(hereafter Lynbrook). 
In Lynbrook, the Board held that a demand for health 
insurance for employees who had already retired at the date of 
negotiations about the demand was nonmandatory.-f The Board, 
however, specifically rejected an argument that a continuation of 
health insurance payments to then current employees after their 
retirement and to their beneficiaries were prohibited retirement 
2/10 PERB f3067 (1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Incorporated 
Village of Lvnbrook v. PERB. 64 A.D.2d 902, 11 PERB 57012 (2d 
Dep't 1978), reinstated. 48 N.Y.2d 398, 12 PERB J[7021 (1979). 
The demand in Lvnbrook provided as follows: 
4. "Hospitalization (Deceased Employees) . . . If an 
employee with one (1) or more years of service or a 
retired employee deceases, his immediate family at the 
time of his demise shall receive the same 
hospitalization as presently provided for active 
employees at no cost to the survivors. The employee's 
spouse shall be given the benefit of this section until 
she re-marries, and the employee's children shall be 
given the benefit of this section until the age of 
nineteen (19) years unless attending college, in which 
case the age limit shall be twenty-three (23) years, or 
specifically qualified because of mental retardation, 
etc., in which case there shall be no age limit. This 
section shall be retroactive so as to provide this 
benefit for all employees regardless of the date of 
their demise and whether it occurred while an active or 
retired employee." 
^In so holding, the Board cited Allied Chemical & Alkali 
Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 
78 LRRM 2974 (1971), which holds that an employer subject to the 
National Labor Relations Act does not have any bargaining 
obligation to a union with respect to persons who are already 
retired at the date of the alleged refusal to bargain. The 
Supreme Court recognized, however, that benefits of active 
workers which are payable to them after retirement, are "part and 
parcel of their overall compensation and hence a well-established 
statutory subject of bargaining." 
Board - U-15003 -5 
benefits under §201.4 of the Act.-7 Accordingly, as to persons 
employed at the time of negotiations, the demand for a 
continuation of hospitalization insurance for them and their 
families was found to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Our decision in Lynbrook, in relevant part, was annulled by 
the Appellate Division, which held the hospitalization insurance 
to be a retirement benefit prohibited from negotiations by §201.4 
of the Act. Even in annulling the determination, however, the 
Appellate Division conceded that the benefit, at least "in a loose 
sense"-7 was earned by an employee's current service. The 
Appellate Division considered, however, that the demand was a 
supplementary payment to retirees, which was intended to be made a 
prohibited subject of negotiation by §2 01.4 of the Act. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division in 
relevant part and reinstated the Board's decision and order in 
Lynbrook. It concluded that §201.4 of the Act, with its "imprecise 
language" and "unrevealing legislative history",-7 should not be 
construed to prohibit this type of otherwise mandatorily negotiable 
demand. As concluded by the Court of Appeals: 
-'That section of the Act provides that "terms and 
conditions of employment" do not "include any benefits provided 
by or to be provided by a public retirement system, a payment to 
a fund or insurer to provide an income for retirees, or payment 
to retirees or their beneficiaries." 
^64 A.D.2d at 903, 11 PERB J7012, at 7023. 
s / 48 N.Y.2d a t 405 , 12 PERB 5 7 0 2 1 , a t 7 0 4 1 . 
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PERB's determination that hospitalization benefits 
are negotiable is also free from the taint of 
irrationality and legal interdiction. It could 
reasonably have concluded that this item, which is 
becoming an increasingly common term of employment in 
this country (footnote omitted), constituted neither 
"payments to a fund or insurer to provide an income for 
retirees" nor "payment of retirees or their 
beneficiaries" (see Civil Service Law §201, subd 4) . 
For here the PBA requested only eontributions to an 
insurer to provide hospitalization benefits. Moreover, 
it seems clear on its face that such insurance, 
especially to protect those whose intimate dependency 
on an employee make their concern his concern, is not 
brought within the common understanding of the general 
statutory term "retirement benefits" merely because the 
plan would continue in effect after current employees 
retire.-'' 
Upon reexamination of Lynbrook, by which we are bound, we 
are compelled to conclude that the duration of a benefit cannot 
be material to a determination regarding its negotiability. 
Under Lynbrook, the limit to the mandatory negotiability of a 
demand like that in issue here is the prohibition in §201.4 of 
the Act. Accordingly, we can no longer adhere to that line of 
cases which have made the duration of a benefit paid to a current 
employee after retirement the dispositive factor in the 
negotiability determination. 
The demand in issue here is indistinguishable from the 
demand found to be mandatorily negotiable in Lynbrook. As the 
PBA's demand is not prohibited by §2 01.4 of the Act as 
interpreted and applied in Lynbrook, it must be held to be a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
We are, however, aware of the policy implications of 
Lynbrook, which we are obliged to follow. Because the union is 
-'Id. at 7042. 
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not the representative of retirees, it has no bargaining rights 
or obligations on behalf of retirees. Similarly, the employer 
could not compel the union to negotiate on their behalf and there 
are questions under Pittsburgh Plate Glass, supra note 3, as to 
the parties7 right to even bargain voluntarily on behalf of 
retirees, at least to the extent the bargaining would effect a 
change in retiree benefits which was unacceptable to them. 
Therefore, the demand once negotiated might well be insulated 
from any subsequent negotiation by the parties. The open-ended, 
unfixed, potentially escalating nature and extent of an 
employer's financial obligations under this type of demand only 
compounds the problems associated with a right of negotiation 
limited to current unit employees. Nonetheless, Lynbrook compels 
the conclusion we reach. The policy issues associated with 
retiree health insurance are best addressed in the context of 
legislation.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
decision is reversed. 
-'In that respect, we are aware of legislative efforts to 
address these issues. For example, under recent legislation, 
school districts and BOCES were prohibited from diminishing 
retiree health insurance benefits through May 15, 1995, unless a 
corresponding diminution is made from active employees. The 
legislation was specifically enacted to afford a period of time 
in which the policy issues associated with retiree health 
insurance could be studied. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai auiine K. Kinsella, cnair 
al£ar I" Eisenberg, Membe 
rperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
) 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Council 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) and cross-exceptions filed by the 
State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) (State or 
DOCS) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director). 
The charge, filed by Council 82, alleges that the State violated 
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§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally transferred unit work, which had been 
performed exclusively by correction officers in the Security 
Services Unit represented by Council 82, to other employees of 
DOCS represented by either the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) or the 
Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). Both CSEA and PEF 
intervened in the proceedings before the Assistant Director. 
CSEA has also filed cross-exceptions and a response to the 
exceptions. 
The Assistant Director found that the State violated the Act 
by transferring certain work to the civilian employees of DOCS 
represented by PEF and CSEA because the State had not changed 
either the level of its service or the qualifications for the 
performance of the work. With respect to other work transfers, 
the Assistant Director found that the State had changed the level 
of its service because the correction officers' function had been 
solely to provide security in those positions and the State was 
no longer providing that level of security.
 N 
Council 82's exceptions focus only on the transfer of 
utility crew positions,-17 which the Assistant Director 
determined did not violate the Act because the level of service 
and the qualifications of the job had been changed. CSEA 
-''Council 82 does not except to the Assistant Director's decision 
insofar as he found the State had not violated the Act when it 
transferred storehouse duties, auto body shop duties and law 
library duties to nonunit employees. 
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supports the Assistant Director's decision in this regard, but it 
excepts to his holding that the transfers of the duties of 
Population Management System (PMS) officer, ID officer and 
Pavilion Officer violated the Act. CSEA argues that those 
transfers were permissible because the qualifications for those 
positions and the level of services provided by the State have 
changed significantly. 
The State's exceptions are two-fold. First, the State 
argues that the Assistant Director erred when he decided PERB had 
jurisdiction over the charge and, in the alternative, when he 
determined that Council 82 had not waived its right to negotiate 
the transfer based on language in the 1988-1991 collective 
bargaining agreement between Council 82 and the State.-7 
Second, like CSEA, the State argues that the Assistant Director 
erred to the extent he found the transfer of the duties of the 
PMS officer, ID officer and Pavilion Officer violated the Act. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm, in part, and 
reverse, in part, the decision of the Assistant Director. 
In mid-1990, the State determined that several correctional 
facilities within geographic proximity would be clustered under a 
single administration, creating what became known as a HUB.-7 
^The State raised both jurisdiction and waiver as affirmative 
defenses in its answer. 
-
7The Oneida HUB, which is the subject of this charge, consists 
of Oneida, Mohawk, Mid-State and Marcy Correctional Facilities. 
A fifth correction facility - Johnstown - was to have been part 
of the HUB, but its construction has not been completed. 
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New inmate programs were to be established, new guidelines for 
existing programs were to be developed, duplicative programs were 
to be abolished, several functions were to be consolidated, 
positions reduced, and certain correction officers (CO) functions 
were to be transferred to civilian employees. It is these 
transfers which form the basis of Council 82's charge. In 
September 1990, the State, facing financial difficulties, also 
began the development of a deficit reduction plan which was to 
result in the elimination of some CO positions and the 
consolidation of others. Both plans were implemented in January 
1991. While originally viewed as two separate plans, they were 
implemented as one.-' 
The State argues that Article 25.8 in its 1988-1991 
collective bargaining agreement with Council 82 divests us of 
jurisdiction over this charge. Alternatively, it argues that the 
clause waives Council 82's right to negotiate the at-issue 
transfer of unit work. Article 25.8 provides as follows: 
The Employer shall not contract out for goods and 
services performed by employees which will result in 
any employee being reduced or laid off without prior 
consultation with the Union concerning any possible 
effect on the terms and employment of employees covered 
by this Agreement. 
Section 2 05.5(d) of the Act denies PERB jurisdiction over a 
violation of an agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization which would not otherwise constitute an improper 
-'Some CO positions were abolished under the deficit reduction 
plan upon the transfer of duties to civilian employees under the 
HUB plan. 
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practice within the meaning of the Act.-7 "Therefore, unless the 
agreement is a reasonably arguable source of right to the 
charging party with respect to the same subject matter as the 
improper practice charge, no contract violation may be 
established, and our jurisdiction is clear."-7 The Assistant 
Director found, in deciding the jurisdictional issue, that the 
clause was arguably a source of right to the State to "contract 
out", but was not a source of right to Council 82 such as would 
divest PERB of jurisdiction. We agree. We are, therefore, 
acting within our jurisdiction in reviewing the clause on its 
merits. 
Turning to the waiver defense raised by the State, we find 
that the in-issue contract language does not establish a waiver 
of the right of Council 82 to negotiate the transfer of its unit 
work. There being no evidence to the contrary, we read the 
phrase "contract out" as referring only to a subcontracting 
relationship between the State and a third party under which that 
third party provides goods or services which previously had been 
provided by the State. It does not, on its face, encompass the 
unilateral reassignment of unit work to other nonunit State 
employees. As the contract is silent about transfers of unit 
work effected other than by subcontract to a third party, it does 
^State of New York fDep't of Health), 25 PERB 53038 (1992). 
^County of Nassau, 23 PERB ?[3051, at 3108 (1990) . 
Board - U-12374 -6 
not establish a knowing, clear and unambiguous waiver of 
Council 82's right to negotiate.-'' 
Having rejected the State's contractual arguments, the 
substantive allegations, alleging a unilateral transfer of unit 
work, must be viewed in the context of our decision in Niagara 
Frontier Transportation Authority (hereafter, Niacrara-
Frontier) .5/ We there held (at 3182): 
With respect to the unilateral transfer of unit work, 
the initial essential questions are whether the work 
had been performed by unit employees exclusively 
(footnote omitted), and whether the reassigned tasks 
are substantially similar to those previously performed 
by unit employees. If both these questions are 
answered in the affirmative, there has been a violation 
of §209-a.l(d), unless the qualifications for the job 
have been changed significantly. Absent such a change, 
the loss of unit work to the unit is sufficient 
detriment for the finding of a violation. If, however, 
there has been a significant change in the job 
qualifications, then a balancing test is invoked; the 
interests of the public employer and the unit 
employees, both individually and collectively, are 
weighed against each other. 
Utilizing these standards, the Assistant Director made 
determinations as to the negotiability of each of the transfers 
title by title. His analysis included a rejection of the State's 
and CSEA's argument that our decisions in City of New Rochelle,-7 
Z/See CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 57011 (3d Dep't 
1982), aff'd. 61 N.Y.2d 1001, 17 PERB 57007 (1984); Cairo-Durham 
Cent. Sch. Dist. , 25 PERB 53059, decision on remand, 25 PERB 
54633 (1992), aff'd, 26 PERB 53012 (1993). 
5/18 PERB 53083 (1983). 
2/13 PERB 53045 (1980) . 
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City of Albany,—' and County of Suffolk—' permitted the transfer 
of certain duties previously performed by COs to civilian 
employees because no unit jobs were lost. In those decisions, we 
held that an employer's reassignment of duties previously 
performed exclusively by police officers to nonunit civilian 
employees did not violate the Act because an 
employer's conduct in assigning to civilians the duties 
in question concerned primarily a determination of the 
qualifications for the respective jobs involved, a 
well-established management right. We also deemed 
significant that no police officers were laid off or 
otherwise adversely affected.—' 
In Niagara-Frontier, we noted that, while these earlier 
civilianization decisions had given emphasis to the absence of 
individual detriment as a significant factor in finding no 
violation, that even if there were a significant impact on unit 
employees, a violation of the Act might still not be found if, 
after applying a balancing test, we found that management 
interests related to an employer's mission predominated over the 
employee interests in their terms and conditions of employment, 
as had been the case, for example, in West Hempstead Union Free 
School District (hereafter, West Hempstead).—; 
Implicit in our analysis in County of Suffolk, City of 
Albany, and City of New Rochelle, was a determination that the 
^
713 PERB ?[3011 (1980) . 
^12 PERB 53123 (1979) . 
^
7City of Albany, supra at 3015. 
^14 PERB 53096 (1981) . 
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reassignment of police duties to civilians was a result of a de 
facto change in the qualifications deemed necessary by the 
employer to perform the duties, as well as a concomitant change 
in the level of service to be offered by the employer. That 
change in qualifications and level of service resulted in a 
balancing of the management interests against the employees' 
interests. In those cases, the employer had determined to 
redeploy police officers to areas in more critical need of their 
police training, while civilians undertook the duties formerly 
performed by the police officers, with no loss of work to the 
unit and no individual loss of employment or benefits. The 
balance there tipped in favor of the employer's interests, in no 
small part due to the absence of significant detriment to the 
unit or individual employees. 
In West Hempstead, there was a significant impact on the 
bargaining unit and on individual employees when the employer 
unilaterally transferred cafeteria supervision from teacher aides 
to teachers. Several employees lost jobs and the bargaining 
agent's status was affected. In West Hempstead, however, it had 
been demonstrated that the aides were unable to maintain a safe 
environment for the students in the cafeteria and the employer 
determined that the teachers might be better able to maintain 
student discipline. After determining that the level of service 
had been changed and that there had been significant impact on 
the bargaining unit, the interests of the employer and the 
employees were balanced. It was determined in West Hempstead 
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that the interests of the employer in providing security for the 
students within its charge and protecting its property 
predominated over the employee interests in their terms and 
conditions of employment. 
Niagara-Frontier did not reverse by word or necessary 
implication any prior decision. To the contrary, prior decisions 
were clarified or adopted. We here reiterate the balancing test 
that we articulated in Niagara-Frontier. Even when an employer 
unilaterally transfers bargaining unit work out of a unit because 
it has determined to change qualifications or its level of 
service, the balancing test must be utilized. The interests of 
unit employees must be weighed against the employer's management 
interest in providing service to its constituency. 
Here, the record establishes that there were significant 
layoffs and transfers at each of the correctional facilities as a 
result of the implementation of the HUB plan and the deficit 
reduction plan. At Mid-State, twenty-one posts were eliminated 
and ten were replaced by newly hired civilian employees; an 
additional six posts were replaced by existing civilian 
staff.—7 Of these, there were two PMS posts, one ID Officer, 
one Pavilion Officer and seven utility crew posts.—f At the 
—'All correction officer posts are either 5-day per week positions, 
with one post equivalent to 1.2 correction officers, or 7 day per 
week positions, with one post equivalent to 1.7 correction officers, 
to take into consideration the relief factor. 
—
7The other posts were positions which, while included in the 
Assistant Director's decision, are not before us on appeal. 
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Marcy facility, twenty-three correction officer items were 
eliminated and two PMS posts, one ID Officer and four 
utility/maintenance posts were replaced by newly hired civilian 
employees. One utility/maintenance post was replaced by an 
existing civilian employee. At Oneida, twenty-six correction 
officer posts were abolished and one ID post, two PMS posts and 
four utility/maintenance posts were replaced by new civilian 
employees. Twenty-nine correction officer posts were abolished; 
one ID post, one PMS post and four utility/maintenance posts were 
filled by newly hired civilians. Against this background, we 
turn to an analysis of the issues by position. 
PMS - All facilities 
The State and CSEA except to the Assistant Director's 
finding that the PMS duties,—/ which were exclusively performed 
by COs represented by Council 82, were transferred to civilian 
employees in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The PMS is a 
computer locating system which tracks the actual location and 
day-to-day movement of inmates within each facility. Since its 
inception in 1988, it has been operated solely by COs, based on 
the State's initial determination that the job was security 
sensitive and fell within the duties of COs to know the 
whereabouts and supervise the inmates within the facility. The 
—''These included the PMS posts at Mid-State, Oneida and Mohawk, the 
Move/Control PMS posts at Mid-State, Oneida and Mohawk, and the 
PMS/Charts post at Mid-State, as well as the PMS duties of the 
former Fire/Safety post at Marcy and the PMS/Adm. Bldg. Porter post 
at Oneida. 
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COs assigned to PMS posts are responsible for the maintenance of 
inmate information involving any movement of the inmates for work 
releases, transfers within or without the facility, medical 
releases, paroles and court appearances; vacancy lists; inmate 
disciplinary history; and inmate affiliations with various groups 
within the facility. While it is usually a sergeant, lieutenant 
or other supervisor who will initiate an inmate move within the 
facility, COs assigned to the PMS post may be consulted regarding 
the inmate's history in the facility. 
The State argues that because there are other computer 
systems, some of which deal with security sensitive 
information,—7 which are operated by employees in the units 
represented by CSEA and PEF, the COs assigned to the PMS post did 
not perform this work exclusively. The State's argument that the 
COs did not perform the work exclusively is rejected. As found 
by the Assistant Director, the State's assertion that other 
nonunit employees have access to computer programs with some 
inmate-tracking responsibilities, which are virtually 
unidentified on this record, is not sufficient to destroy the 
exclusivity of the work performed by the COs in the PMS post. 
Further, the record supports the Assistant Director's 
finding that although there have been some additional duties 
—
;The State identified an FPMS program which "gives us more 
information than PMS, including [the inmates'] locking locations, 
but it gives us much more information about the inmate and enemies 
that he might have." 
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assigned to the civilian employees,—7 their primary function is 
to track the location and movement of inmates within the system, 
the same duties previously performed by the COs. The Assistant 
Director correctly found that the additional clerical and 
switchboard duties performed by the civilian PMS employees had 
not substantially altered the duties of the position, or changed 
its qualifications.—7 In addition, there was a loss to the 
unit, and individual employees, of a number of positions in the 
affected facilities. Applying the Niagara-Frontier balancing 
test, the employees' interest in their terms and conditions of 
employment predominates over the State's claim that it sought to 
improve the service rendered by those in the PMS position. The 
conclusion that must be drawn is that the transfer was motivated 
less by a plan to improve service and more by the concerns which 
brought about the deficit reduction plan, especially the savings 
to be realized by replacing a Grade 14 CO with a Grade 6 keyboard 
operator. Having so found, we conclude that this interest does 
not outweigh the loss of unit work as occurred here, and that the 
Assistant Director's decision must be affirmed in this regard. 
—
7The PMS job description for COs also includes the provision of 
clerical support as needed. 
—
xThe record evidence establishes that the new duties, including the 
increase in workload occasioned by the creation of new HUB programs, 
accounts for only 2 0% of the civilian employees' duties. The 
remainder of the PMS/civilian employees' duties are precisely the 
same as those performed by the COs at PMS posts. 
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ID - All facilities 
The State and CSEA except to the Assistant Director's 
determination that the State's transfer of ID duties out of the 
unit was a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. From 1972 to 
1991, all duties relating to identification cards, photographing 
and fingerprinting inmates and/or employees at the facilities now 
a part of the HUB were performed exclusively by COs. These 
duties were transferred to civilian employees in early 1991. The 
State argues that after the creation of the HUB, the ID clerk 
position was reviewed and, based upon the assessment that the 
duties could be better performed by a civilian, the State sought 
a new civil service job description.—'' The duties performed by 
the COs over time have changed from the use of photographic 
equipment to the use of computer imaging. The Assistant Director 
found that the qualifications of the position had not changed 
when it was assigned to civilian employees and that the State had 
not established that the COs could no longer adequately perform 
the duties of the position. We agree. The State transferred the 
ID functions which had been exclusively performed by the COs to 
civilian employees, with no substantial change in duties or in 
the qualifications for the job, other than that which is inherent 
in any civilianization of services. The State presented no 
—
7The proposed duties description reflects no change in duties, 
however, and no specific qualifications for the position, except 
that, after appointment, the incumbent must complete a course in 
photography and processing. At the time of the hearing, the Civil 
Service Department had not yet adopted the proposed duties 
description. 
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evidence that the COs were inadequately performing the duties of 
the position or that they were unable to take the same course as 
was expected of newly hired civilian employees in the operation 
of the more sophisticated equipment. Thus, the State 
demonstrated no significant need to transfer the ID work to 
nonunit employees to enable it to undertake the performance of 
its basic mission, as was the case in West Hempstead. The only 
interest of the State which has been served by the transfer is an 
economic savings, especially in labor costs, which we have found 
does not, by itself, excuse the obligation to bargain under the 
Act.—/ Balancing this economic savings against the subsequent 
loss of work to Council 82's unit members, with the resultant 
transfers and layoffs, we find that the State violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally transferred the ID 
duties to civilian employees. 
Pavilion Officer (Mid-State) 
Both the State and CSEA argue that the Assistant Director 
erred in finding that the transfer of the Pavilion Officer's 
duties to a civilian employee was improper. At Mid-State, until 
March 1991, a CO was assigned to the pavilion area, which is 
where inmates assigned to utility or maintenance crews assembled 
before being directed to their work location. The CO's 
responsibilities included supervising the inmates until the 
^County of Chatauqua, 22 PERB }[3016 (1989) ; Saratoga Springs Sch. 
Dist. . 11 PERB 5[3037 (1978), conf '&. 68 A.D.2d 202, 12 PERB 5[7008 
(3d Dep't 1979), motion for leave to appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 711, 
12 PERB 5[7012 (1979) . 
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officers assigned to the work crews arrived, dispensing tools to 
the inmates and controlling the tools and the tool room. The 
State argued to the Assistant Director that inconsistent 
supervision of the crews and problems with equipment maintenance 
led it to reassign the pavilion post duties to civilian 
employees—7 in March 1991. The Assistant Director found that, 
although the maintenance of tools and equipment did improve at 
some facilities after the reassignment, the record did not 
establish that there was an objective, reasonable basis for the 
State's belief that civilians could provide better service in the 
pavilion position by virtue of their qualifications.—7 The 
State made a determination that the qualifications of the job 
could be satisfied by a civilian employee and that the specific 
job qualifications for a correction officer are no longer 
necessary, or as the State argues, in fact, deter the incumbent 
from fully performing some of the duties of the position.—7 
There is no evidence that the security aspects of the position 
have been altered in any way and it appears that the civilian 
employees are expected to supervise the inmates just as the COs 
did as Pavilion Officer. 
—
7The civilians are groundskeepers or senior groundskeepers. 
^Compare Town of Brookhaven, 17 PERB f3 087 (1984), and West 
Hempstead, supra. 
—
7The State argued that the rotating shift assignment of the COs to 
the position resulted not only in an inconsistency in both 
supervision of the inmates and the tools, but also deficiencies in 
record-keeping. 
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Once again, weighing the interests of the employees against 
the concerns articulated by the State, we find the employees' 
interests prevail. While there may have been some inadequacies 
noted in the performance of some of the record-keeping duties by 
the COs assigned,—7 there is no evidence that those problems 
can be attributed to the fact that it was a CO performing the 
duties instead of a civilian employee. Indeed, the completion of 
required reports is included in the job descriptions of both the 
CO and the Senior Groundskeeper, who was assigned work previously 
performed by CO Pavilion Officers. We, therefore, affirm the 
Assistant Director's finding of a violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the 
Act. 
Utility Crews - All Facilities^7 
Council 82's only exception relates to the Assistant 
Director's finding that the State did not violate the Act when it 
reassigned the supervision of utility crews from COs to civilian 
employees. Previously, a CO was assigned to supervise utility 
crews comprised of approximately ten inmates who performed 
unskilled utility or maintenance work, such as lawn-mowing, at 
the correctional facility. Included in the job description for 
the CO-Utility crew are the following requirements: account for 
—'No disciplinary action was taken against any Pavilion Officer and 
no discussions were initiated by the State with Council 82 to 
address these perceived deficiencies. 
—
7As noted by the Assistant Director, for the purpose of this 
decision, the term "utility crew" incorporates post titles Utility 
Crew, Maint. Gang, Inside Maint., and Env. Sanitation Team. 
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and report on equipment and whereabouts of inmates, ensure that 
the required maintenance or utility work is completed, frisk 
inmates to ascertain that no contraband is concealed by an 
inmate, keep unauthorized inmates out of the work area and be 
alert to the potential for escape of inmates from the gang and 
devote the time and effort necessary to detect and prevent 
escapes. In 1991, this work, which had been performed 
exclusively by COs,—' was unilaterally reassigned to civilian 
employees, primarily groundskeepers or senior groundskeepers. 
The Assistant Director held that the State did not violate 
the Act because it was within its prerogative to alter the level 
of service it provides and to alter the qualifications of the 
employees who provide it. Council 82 argues that the Assistant 
Director erred when he did not apply the balancing test 
articulated in Niagara-Frontier to this transfer. We agree with 
Council 82. As noted earlier, there is an inherent determination 
to alter level of services and job qualifications in any 
civilianization situation. However, a balancing of the 
employer's interests against the employees7 interests is then 
^Both CSEA and the State argue that the work was not exclusive 
because there were civilian employees who supervised trained or 
skilled utility crews. However, those crews were also supervised by 
a CO who performed the security function while the civilian employee 
provided the instructional supervision. The COs assigned to 
supervise the unskilled utility or maintenance crews provide no 
instructional supervision, only a security function. The work is 
different enough to establish a discernible boundary of exclusivity. 
See Countv of Onondaga, 24 PERB fl3014 (1991), confid, 187 A.D.2d 
1014, 25 PERB 57015 (4th Dep't 1992), motion for leave to appeal 
denied, 81 N.Y.2d 706, 26 PERB ^7003 (1993). 
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still required. Here, the State introduced no evidence that the 
utility/maintenance crew duties had been so inadequately 
performed by the COs in the past to warrant a change in job 
qualifications. In fact, as with the Pavilion Officer, the 
ability to complete reports and keep records is an aspect of both 
the CO and the Senior Groundskeeper job descriptions. Further, 
the record reflects the State's position that the job duties 
remained essentially the same. Indeed, there is no evidence that 
a determination had been made that the security function 
previously performed by COs was no longer required. Civilian 
groundskeepers who have been assigned to supervise the utility 
crews are also expected to maintain control over the inmates, 
give them "tickets" for inappropriate behavior and frisk them if 
deemed necessary, and none of these duties are part of a 
groundskeeper's job description. The State presented no credible 
evidence which would support a finding that the transfer was 
necessary to further the performance of its basic mission. The 
State realized a savings in labor costs by transferring the 
duties from COs to civilian employees. As noted previously, 
however, economic reasons do not, by themselves, outweigh 
employee interests so as to permit an employer to avoid 
bargaining obligations under the Act.—' Balancing the 
significant impact on the unit against the State's interests, we 
find that the State's unilateral transfer of the supervision of 
—
/County of Chatauqua, supra. 
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the utility/maintenance crews to civilian employees violates 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
We, therefore, find that the exceptions of Council 82 should 
be granted, that the exceptions of CSEA and the State should be 
dismissed, and that the decision of the Assistant Director be 
affirmed as to the PMS officers, the ID officers and the Pavilion 
Officer post at Mid-State and reversed as to the utility/ 
maintenance crew officers. 
IT IS, THEREFORE ORDERED that the State: 
1. Forthwith reinstate the PMS posts at Mid-State, Oneida 
and Mohawk, the Move/Control PMS posts at Mid-State, Oneida and 
Mohawk, and the PMS/Charts post at Mid-State, the Pavilion 
Officer at Mid-State, the ID posts at Mid-State, Oneida and 
Mohawk, and the utility/maintenance crew posts at Mid-State, 
Oneida, Marcy and Mohawk which were eliminated in or about March 
1991 under the HUB/deficit reduction plan, offer reinstatement to 
those posts to the COs who were reassigned as a result of their 
elimination, and offer reinstatement, with back pay and benefits, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate from the date of their 
termination until the effective date of the offer of 
reinstatement, to any unit employees who were terminated as a 
result of the elimination of said posts and make unit employees 
whole for the loss of any wages, salary, and benefits suffered as 
a result of the State's elimination of these posts and the 
reassignments and transfers which resulted therefrom; 
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2. Forthwith restore to the unit the PMS duties of the 
former Fire/Safety post at Marcy, the ID duties of the former 
ID/Recp. post at Marcy, and the PMS duties of the former PMS/Adm. 
Bldg. Porters post at Oneida, and make employees whole for the 
loss of any salary, wages and benefits suffered as a result of 
the State's elimination of these duties and the reassignments and 
transfers which resulted therefrom; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to unit employees at 
the correction facilities which make up the Oneida HUB. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
ILl^iLk^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
2fL CLOA 
Wal^erTj. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees in the unit represented by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) will: 
1. Forthwith reinstate the PMS posts at Mid-State, Oneida and Mohawk, the Move/Control PMS 
posts at Mid-State, Oneida and Mohawk, and the PMS/Charts post at Mid-State, the Pavilion 
Officer at Mid-State, the ID posts at Mid-State, Oneida and Mohawk, and the 
utility/maintenance crew posts at Mid-State, Oneida, Marcy and Mohawk which were 
eliminated in or about March 1991 under the HUB/deficit reduction plan, offer reinstatement 
to those posts to the COs who were reassigned as a result of their elimination, and offer 
' reinstatement, with back pay and benefits, with interest at the maximum legal rate from the 
date of their termination until the effective date of the offer of reinstatement, to any unit 
employees who were terminated as a result of the elimination of said posts and make unit 
employees whole for the loss of any wages, salary, and benefits suffered as a result of the 
State's elimination of these posts and the reassignments and transfers which resulted 
therefrom. 
2. Forthwith restore to the unit the PMS duties of the former Fire/Safety post at Marcy, the ID 
duties of the former ID/Recp. post at Marcy, and the PMS duties of the former PMS/Adm. 
Bldg. Porters post at Oneida, and make employees whole for the loss of any salary, wages 
and benefits suffered as a result of the State's elimination of these duties and the 
reassignments and transfers which resulted therefrom. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
F- 9 /3O/94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OP UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
NORTHPORT/EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, CARLE PLACE UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROOSEVELT UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, and WYANDANCH UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employers, 
- and -
LOCAL 144, LONG ISLAND DIVISION, SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, APL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
COUNTY OP ALBANY and ALBANY COUNTY CASE NO. C-4224 
SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
CASE NOS. C-4165, C-4166. 
C-4171. C-4172 
& C-4175 
Intervenor. 
Board - Case Nos. C-4165, C-4166, C-4171, -2 
C-4172, C-4175 and C-4224 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C., for Petitioner United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 42 4, A Division of United Industry 
Workers District Council 42 4 
VLADECK, WALDMAN, ELIAS & ENGELHARD, P.C. (LARRY CARY of 
counsel), for Intervenor Local 144, Long Island Division, 
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO 
GEORGE A. JACKSON, for South Huntington Union Free School 
District 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of 
counsel), for Intervenor Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
filed by Local 144, Long Island Division, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO (Local 144) and the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
After a hearing conducted pursuant to an earlier remand,-1 the 
Director held that United Public Service Employees Union, Local 424 
(Local 424), A Division of United Industry Workers District 
Council 424 (District Council) is an employee organization within the 
meaning of §2 01.5-7 of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act 
(Act). 
1/27 PERB 13025 (1994) . 
-'Section 201.5 of the Act provides in relevant part as follows: 
The term "employee organization" means an organization 
of any kind having as its primary purpose the 
improvement of terms and conditions of employment of 
public employees . . . . 
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Although differing in certain particulars, Local 144's and 
CSEA's exceptions are materially the same, as have been their basic 
arguments throughout these proceedings concerning Local 424's status 
as an employee organization. Both Local 144 and CSEA argue that 
Local 424 is not an employee organization under §201.5 of the Act 
because the District Council so dominates and controls Local 424 that 
it is either not an organization at all or is one which is powerless 
to exercise its rights and fulfill its obligations as a bargaining 
agent under the Act. They argue that the Director's conclusion to 
the contrary is not supported by the record. 
Local 424, in response, argues that the Director's conclusion is 
supported by the record, is consistent both with our prior decisions 
and the policies of the Act, and should be affirmed. 
Local 144's and CSEA's exceptions and Local 424's response 
thereto raise certain questions which are ancillary to the issue of 
Local 424's status as an employee organization within the meaning of 
the Act. We will consider these first because the discussion will 
provide a background for an analysis of the main issue. 
The District Council is not a petitioner nor a party in any of 
these cases. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the District 
Council is an employee organization and we express no opinion on the 
merit of CSEA's argument that it is not. 
Local 424 challenges our remand to the Director, arguing that we 
were powerless to issue that order because we may not make any 
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inquiry into a union's internal affairs or otherwise interfere in any 
way with any union's chosen method of operation. 
The remand was for the purpose of obtaining information bearing 
upon Local 424's status as an employee organization. That inquiry 
was triggered by Local 144's and GSEA's allegations that Local 424 is 
not an employee organization and by Local 424's disclosures regarding 
amendments to its and the District Council's constitutions, which 
Local 424 made to us for the first time on appeal from the Director's 
first decisions.-7 We are not barred from investigating a union's 
"internal affairs" and "operations" as and to the extent those 
affairs or operations are relevant to the entity's status as an 
employee organization. We are charged by the Legislature under §207 
of the Act with a duty to resolve representation disputes. When a 
question is raised as to the status of an "employee organization", it 
is our responsibility to resolve that dispute, just as when a 
question is raised concerning "public employee" or "public employer" 
status. Moreover, even were our investigation and determination 
regarding Local 424's status not jurisdictionally compelled and 
permitted, an organization's act of petitioning us for certification, 
which affords it substantial statutory rights and privileges, 
constitutes that organization's consent to our inquiry into its 
affairs and operations as and to the extent necessary and appropriate 
to our jurisdictional determinations. 
^27 PERB H4015 (1994) and 27 PERB f4020 (1994). 
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Local 424 also argues that we cannot and should not question 
Local 424's status as an employee organization because that inquiry 
is contrary to public policy generally and the specific policies of 
the Act. The underlying theory appears to be that employees have an 
absolute constitutional-7 and statutory right-7 to be represented by 
an organization of their own choosing. The constitutional right to 
organize, however, has been held not to cast a correlative obligation 
upon an employer to bargain collectively.-1 Implementation of that 
constitutional right of organization has been left to the 
Legislature. The constitutional right of public employees can be 
exercised only pursuant to the requirements of the Act, which permits 
their representation only through an employee organization as defined 
in the Act.-7 The Legislature has chosen not to require public 
employers to bargain except with employee organizations and not to 
^N.Y. Const, art. 1, §17. 
^Act, §§202 & 203. 
^District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. N.Y. Shipping 
Ass_ln, 29 A.D.2d 139 (2d Dep't 1968), modified on other grounds, 
22 N.Y.2d 809 (1968), cert, denied. 393 U.S. 960 (1968); Erie 
County Water Auth. v. Kramer, 208 Misc. 292 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 
1955), rev'd on other grounds, 4 A.D.2d 545 (4th Dep't 1957), 
aff_ld, 5 N.Y.2d 954 (1959). 
-'Definitions of comparable terms under other statutes are not 
controlling. N.Y. Labor Law §721 (union fiduciary obligations 
and financial reporting); N.Y. Civil Rights Law §43 (union 
membership discrimination). These other definitions have limited 
applications for particular purposes and do not enlarge, restrict 
or modify the definition of the term "employee organization" 
under the Act. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 2 93 N.Y. 315 
(1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
Board - Case Nos. C-4165, C-4166, C-4171, -6 
C-4172, C-4175 and C-4224 
permit public employees to be represented for purposes of the Act by 
anything other than an employee organization as defined, even if all 
of the employees in a given unit wish otherwise. In fulfillment of 
the Legislature's policy, it is our statutory duty to ensure that the 
organizations which seek the many benefits afforded by certification 
meet the definition in the Act under which those rights may be 
claimed and exercised. It is in this way that the rights of the 
public employees, public employers and other employee organizations 
are protected. 
We begin our analysis of the main issue in dispute by 
reiterating our opinion, and that of all earlier Boards, that the 
definition of an employee organization is properly given a liberal 
interpretation. No Board has ever insisted upon the satisfaction of 
specific indicia of "organization" status, lest the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively through organizations 
of their own choosing be unnecessarily circumscribed. However broad 
the interpretation and application of the statutory definition 
insofar as "organization" status has been, all Boards have been 
careful in interpreting the "primary purpose" element of the 
statutory definition to ensure that the entity seeking certification 
is both willing and able to serve as the representative of the unit 
employees. 
Very early in its history, the Board was presented with the 
"employee organization" issue in the context of local unions that 
represented both private sector and public sector employees. In 
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those decisions, the Board concluded that the petitioning 
organization could meet the statutory definition of an employee 
organization only if the public employees whom the local wanted to 
represent were ensured their independence from the private sector.-'' 
Every Board to date has agreed that an organization "of any kind" 
cannot have as its "primary purpose" the improvement of the terms and 
conditions of public employees if the entity to be certified is not 
the representative in fact of the employees it seeks to represent and 
is not itself empowered to exercise the rights and carry out the 
duties of a bargaining agent. 
Also relevant in articulating the framework for analysis of the 
issue in this case is Manhasset Union Free School District.-7 In 
that case, the Board dismissed a certification petition where the 
record established that a petitioner had reached an agreement with 
another union under which that other union would represent a part of 
the negotiating unit. The Board reasoned that it is the petitioner, 
and the petitioner alone, which must represent unit employees. The 
petitioner's partial delegation of its duties as the exclusive 
bargaining agent to an entity which was not seeking certification was 
held an abandonment of part of the unit and inconsistent with the 
intent necessarily underlying all certification petitions, 
necessitating the dismissal of the petition. 
g/State of New York, 1 PERB ^399.85, aff'g 1 PERB ^424 (1968); 
Village of Mineola, 13 PERB [^3024 (1980) . 
^12 PERB f3059 (1979). 
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The cases we have just cited clearly stand for the proposition 
that an organization is not an employee organization within the 
meaning of the Act, and cannot be certified as such, if the conduct 
of its affairs bearing upon the representation of unit employees is 
eontrolled or subject to the control of anotherentity which is not a 
party to the petition.—7 Therefore, if there is support in the 
record—' for Local 144's and CSEA's argument that the District 
Council either does or has the power to dominate or control 
Local 424's decisions regarding the representation of public 
employees, we would be compelled to dismiss the petitions that 
Local 424 has filed in these cases. 
In finding Local 424 to be an employee organization, the 
Director focused upon Local 424's and the District Council's actual 
practice to date with respect to collective negotiations and 
grievance administration. The Director concluded that Local 424 had 
served as a negotiating agent in those respects without the District 
Council's actual control. In reaching his conclusion, however, the 
Director acknowledged that provisions in the District Council's and 
—
7See Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
New York, 15 PERB 5[3041 (1982), where we observed that an 
organization might not meet the statutory definition if it 
permitted a nonpetitioning organization to exercise its rights 
and responsibilities as a certified bargaining agent. We 
dismissed a challenge to the organization's status in that case, 
however, because there was no proof of an impermissible 
delegation of power or responsibility. 
—
7We have, as Local 424 has requested, not considered in reaching 
our decision in these cases an affidavit dated January 7, 1994 
filed by Local 144's attorney as part of its exceptions to the 
Director's original decisions. 
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Local 424's constitutions put Local 424 "at risk by some future 
action of the District Council." He dismissed the risk, however, by 
concluding that "there is nothing in either [the Local 424 or 
District Council] constitution which disables Local 424 from fully 
functioning as a negotiating agent and [Local 424] has sufficiently 
demonstrated this ability by its past and present conduct." 
We conclude, however, that Local 424 has been deprived of 
autonomy by the District Council to such a degree as to make it 
incapable of certification as an employee organization under the Act. 
The independence of operation the Board has demanded of an 
organization seeking certification under the Act is simply not 
present in the current relationship between Local 424 and the 
District Council as constitutionally structured. That the District 
Council has to date perhaps not chosen to exercise the full range of 
its power to control Local 424 is immaterial given the sweeping 
nature and extent of the powers the District Council possesses and 
may exercise at will. 
In reaching this conclusion, we have relied primarily on the 
constitutions of the two organizations in their most recently amended 
form, for these are most favorable to Local 424. We have assumed for 
purposes of our analysis that the amendments were valid, despite each 
organization's apparent disregard of the language of the controlling 
constitutional provisions. Having concluded that these constitutions 
disable Local 424 from certification, we also need not decide whether 
those amendments should be applied retroactively to the dates these 
petitions were filed. We note in this regard only that the 
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constitutions in their original forms even more clearly evidenced the 
District Council's power to control Local 424's operations and 
affairs.—; 
Our decision herein is premised upon a combination of facts and 
circumstances which evidence a relationship in which the District 
Council does control many of Local 424's decisions and has the power 
to effectively control all decisions concerning the representation of 
public employees. The control is such as to render Local 424 
incapable of functioning as the bargaining agent of the employees in 
the units its seeks to represent under these petitions. 
We begin our analysis with a review of the constitutional 
relationships between Local 424 and the District Council. Article 
10, section 8 of Local 424's constitution requires that its 
constitution conform to the District Council's constitution and by-
laws in all respects. This same result is effected by Article 14, §1 
of the District Council's constitution, which requires that 
Local 424's constitution and by-laws comply with the District 
Council's constitution and further subjects Local 424's constitution 
and by-laws to approval by the General President of the District 
Council. The District Council's decisions regarding any unresolved 
conflict of interpretation is final. Local 424 is also not empowered 
to amend its own constitution to eliminate those provisions which 
cede control to the District Council. Any amendments to Local 424's 
constitution and by-laws must be submitted to the District Council 
-'See the discussion of Article 16 infra. 
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for its approval. Nor may Local 424 leave the District Council 
without the District Council's consent. The District Council's 
constitution, with which Local 424 must comply, forbids Local 424 
from dissolving, seceding or disaffiliating from the District Council 
except upon terms specified by the District Council, and then only 
with the approval of the District Council's Executive Board. Even 
upon secession, dissolution or disaffiliation, all assets remain with 
the District Council. 
The District Council's power of control is also manifest under 
other provisions of the District Council's constitution. Under 
Article 13 of the District Council's constitution, to which Local 424 
is bound, all membership dues and fees are the sole property of the 
District Council. Local 424 itself has no assets of any kind and it 
may not bind the District Council to any indebtedness without the 
written authority of the District Council's Executive Board. As 
approved by the District Council's Executive Board, the District 
Council pays Local 424's expenses. 
These financial provisions obviously make Local 424 entirely 
dependent upon the District Council for all of its operations and 
services. It is, indeed, the District Council that supplies and 
oversees the staff which negotiates and administers Local 424 
collective bargaining agreements. Local 424 has denied itself any 
assets, even those dues and fees to which it is entitled as the 
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certified bargaining agent,—7 deprived itself of the power to 
commit resources, and made itself wholly dependent upon the 
willingness of the District Council to pay its expenses. The point 
is not whether to date there has been any "problem" with these 
financial arrangements; it is the power of the District Council to 
effectively control Local 424 under arrangements to which Local 424 
has voluntarily subjected itself which is the focus of our concern. 
While some of these structural relationships may be found to 
some degree in other employee organizations, the cumulative effect of 
these provisions is to give the District Council the power to control 
all of Local 424's affairs, for it is wholly captive to the wishes of 
the District Council. The point, we believe, is simple yet most 
compelling. At any time it wants, the District Council may amend its 
constitution in any respect, and Local 424's own constitution will 
compel it to adopt that same provision, irrespective of its opinion 
regarding its merit. Just as an example of the potential 
significance of this provision, Article 16 of the District Council's 
constitution at one time made the District Council the spokesperson 
in all transactions involving Local 424, including collective 
negotiations. The District Council had to sign any of Local 424's 
collective bargaining agreements to make them valid and the District 
Council administered and enforced all of Local 424's agreements. 
That Article has been amended at least three times to eliminate or 
—
7The rights to membership dues deductions and agency shop fee 
deductions belong to the certified or recognized bargaining agent 
under §2 08 of the Act. 
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minimize the District Council's actual or apparent control in these 
respects, largely, if not entirely, in response to the challenges to 
Local 424's status mounted by Local 144 and CSEA in these cases. The 
ease with which and the informality under which these amendments were 
made,-as described in the Director's decision,- further reflects the 
District Council's control over Local 424. It is, for example, even 
under Local 424 President Kevin Boyle's "conforming amendments 
theory",—/ the District Council which decides whether the amendment 
is beneficial or detrimental to Local 424. The controlling point, 
however, is that there is nothing preventing the District Council 
from making subsequent amendments restoring or imposing its control 
in these respects or any other, and Local 424 would have no choice 
but to comply and conform. 
In a similar representation context, we relied upon the 
existence of a power to control, rather than practice in fact, in 
holding that the joint employer relationship between a county and an 
elected sheriff necessitated the fragmentation of sheriff department 
employees. Either party to that joint employer relationship could 
cease its delegation of authority to a single group of government 
officials at any time. Therefore, even though the actual practice in 
a given case might not have evidenced the sheriff's exercise of the 
—'As explained by Boyle, when an amendment of the District 
Council's constitution confers a benefit on Local 424, 
Local 424's constitution is automatically changed without having 
to comply with the constitutional provisions governing 
amendments. Conversely, an amendment which negatively affected 
Local 424 would require a vote of Local 424's membership. 
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powers of that office, it was the potential for the exercise of that 
power which caused us to fragment long-standing units.—/ In 
emphasizing the District Council's power to control Local 424's 
decisions, we rely upon a factor which has been dispositive of other 
representation questions. 
There are many other facts which, together with the previously 
recited structural relationships, evidence and establish the District 
Council's control of the organization it created to represent public 
sector employees. For example, many of the officers of Local 424 are 
officers of the District Council. Boyle is the General Executive 
Vice-President of the District Council and President of Local 424, 
installed in the latter capacity by the District Council. He is also 
a paid officer and employee of the District Council and receives no 
compensation for services rendered as Local 424's President. Henry 
Miller is the General President of the District Council and 
Secretary-Treasurer of Local 424, also installed in the latter 
capacity by the District Council. Kim Nowakowski is the Recording 
Secretary of both organizations. The record evidences that in these 
dual capacities, the incumbents have acted either without an 
appreciation of any distinction between the organizations or in 
disregard of those distinctions. Local 424's Executive Board, 
consisting of Boyle, Miller, Nowakowski, a vice-president and a 
trustee, has never met. Certain of Local 424's officers have not 
^'See County of Clinton and Sheriff of Clinton County, 18 PERB 
?[3070 (1985) . 
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functioned as required by its constitution, apparently delegating 
those functions by abandonment to the District Council. As President 
of Local 424, Boyle is constitutionally required to preside over all 
meetings of the Local, but in conformity with the District Council's 
constitution. In his capacity of General Vice-President of the 
District Council, Boyle is in charge of all organizational 
activities, negotiations and contract enforcement and has direction 
and control over all business agents, organizers and representatives. 
The District Council establishes and controls the procedures 
pertaining to dues and agency fee refunds required by the Act. 
Membership in Local 424 is limited to those public employees who 
agree to abide by the District Council's constitution. It is the 
District Council's General Executive Board that has the power to 
hear, decide and determine all matters and all questions concerning 
or affecting Local 424's members. That same District Council Board 
has full and complete power to make any rules it considers "necessary 
or desirable" in connection with any matters or questions concerning 
Local 424 and its members. The General Executive Board of the 
District Council has the power to determine the membership of 
Local 424 and other of its divisions. 
From our review of this record, we are compelled to conclude 
that Local 424 in its present form is incapable of serving as the 
bargaining agent in any of the units for which it seeks 
certification. In net effect, Local 424 is, at best, an 
instrumentality of the District Council, merely enabling the latter 
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to represent public employees. Local 424, through provisions in its 
constitution, and those in the District Council's, to which it is 
bound, is not to any significant degree distinguishable from the 
District Council and it cannot serve as the bargaining agent in fact 
of the employees it seeks to represents Local 424 cannot have as its 
primary purpose the improvement of terms and conditions of employment 
of public employees because it is ultimately powerless to do so. 
Local 424's constitutional and actual relationship to the District 
Council, combined with its divestiture of all assets of any kind, 
leaves it in a position where it is unable by itself to take any 
action of consequence under the Act. As we have previously held, we 
cannot certify an organization as the exclusive representative of a 
unit of public employees when another organization has the ultimate 
power to control the representation of those employees. 
Our decision finding that Local 424 as presently constituted is 
not an employee organization is one we reach with an awareness of the 
ramifications. These petitions must be dismissed on our finding and 
the employees in these units are thereby deprived of an opportunity 
to choose whether they want to be represented by Local 424. The 
decision we make, however, is necessary to protect the statutory 
rights of the employees in these units, their public employers and 
other employee organizations which currently represent or may seek to 
represent them. As temporarily disruptive of the labor relationships 
in these governments as it may be, our dismissal of these petitions 
carries out the Legislature's declared policies and ensures that the 
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employees are represented by an employee organization itself 
empowered to act on their behalf. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
reversed and it is ordered that the petitions in the captioned cases 
must be, and-hereby are, dismissed.—' 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
aniline R. Kirfeel la , Chai ^ P ul  insel  hairperson 
alter L. Eisenberg, Member(^ 
—
/Local 424 renews in its brief a motion for the recusal of 
Member Schmertz. That motion was denied by Member Schmertz at 
the oral argument prior to the remand to the Director. Member 
Schmertz denies the motion as renewed for the reasons stated at 
the oral argument. Member Schmertz, nonetheless, did not 
participate in the discussion or decision in these cases. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1170, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-=.and= ......... CASE NO. C-3449 
TOWN OF GREECE, 
Employer. 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SALISBURY & CAMBRIA (EUGENE 
SALISBURY of counsel), for Petitioner 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (PETER SMITH of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to our Order dated May 31, 1994,-7 an 
election was held on August 23, 1994, to determine whether 
employees of the Town of Greece in the unit described below 
desired to be represented by Local 1170, Communications Workers 
of America, AFL-CIO (petitioner): 
Included: Library Director, Fire Marshall, Building 
Inspector and Assessor. 
Excluded: Town Supervisor, Town Board Members and all other 
employees of the Town. 
At the election,--, one ballot was cast in favor of 
representation by the petitioner•and one ballot was cast against 
such representation; there were no challenged ballots. 
lf
 27 PERB 1(3024 (1994) 
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Inasmuch as the results of the election do not indicate that 
the majority of eligible voters in the unit-7 described above 
who cast ballots desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the 
petition should be, and it hereby is, dismissed.-7 
DATED: September 30,-1994 
Albany, New York 
%d.\ ' T ^ U , 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
Walter, L. Eisenberg, Me 
3/ 
There are four employees in the unit. 
Since only one employee organization was involved in the 
election, no run-off election is called for by the Board's 
Rules of Procedure. Merrick Library, 17 PERB 1(3070, at 310! 
n.l. (1984) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4164 
GUILDERLAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
GUILDERLAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Guilderland Central School 
District Employees Association, NEA/NY has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
Certification - C-4164 
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collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All transportation, maintenance, custodial and 
cafeteria employees. 
Excluded: Substitutes, supervisors and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Guilderland Central School 
District Employees Association, NEA/NY. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Cha: irperson 
K 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem! 
Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4237 
SMITHTOWN FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full time employees in the titles of: 
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Fire House Attendant I, II, and III; Custodial 
Worker I, II and III; Maintenance Mechanic I, 
II, and III; and Auto Mechanic I, II and III. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil.. Service Employees ... 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
ji-JL/^ fL*K\t&\ £x-
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
r. 
Walter L. E i senberg , Member 
E r i c J / S c h m e r t z , Member 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HUNTINGTON SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4250 
TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 342, UNITED MARINE DIVISION 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN ASSOCIATION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 342, United Marine 
Division International Longshoreman Association, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All supervisory employees, including, but not 
limited to: Assistant to the Controller, Auto 
Mechanics Supervisor II and III, Beach Manager, 
Dog Control Officer II, Executive Assistant of 
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the Dix Hills Water District, Golf Course 
Manager, Grounds Maint. Supervisor, Harbor 
Master, Incinerator Plant Supervisor, Labor 
Supervisor I, II, III, IV, Refuse Manager, 
Sanitation Site Supervisor, Secretary to 
Highway Superintendent, Secretary to Planning 
Board, Sr. Bay Constable, Sr. Citizens 
Director, Sr. Citizens Site Man., Sr. Dog 
Warden, Sr. Harbor Master, Sr. Sewage Plant 
Operator. & Superintendent of Dix Hills Water 
District. 
Excluded:—All- summer/casual employees and-all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 342, United Marine 
Division International Longshoreman Association, AFL-CIO. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
» SI 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
J. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 445, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4255 
ULSTER COUNTY RESOURCE RECOVERY 
AGENCY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Union Local 445 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Ail blue collar employees, including those in 
the following positions: 
Scalehouse Operator, Landfill Operator, 
Truck Driver/Operator, Landfill Laborer and 
Mechanic. 
Certification - C-4255 
Excluded: All clerical and other employees of the 
Employer. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Union Local 445. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
-yjJt^Y-.k^U 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric if. Schmertz, Membeif 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4256 
TOWN OF CLIFTON PARK, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: See attached 
Excluded: See attached 
Certification - C-4256 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
jLU. t ' Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
r~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
*>&„... 
Eric/u. Schmertz, Membe 
ATTACHMENT 
Included: All employees working 27 or more hours per 
week in the following job titles: 
Senior Planner 
Senior Building Inspector 
Chief Bureau of Fire Prevention 
Senior Typist/Deputy Town Clerk/Vital Statistics 
Information Processing Specialist 
Building Maintenance 
Building Mechanic 
Receptionist 
Building Inspector 
Account Clerk 
Parks Maintenance Supervisor 
Laborer 
Senior Typist 
Senior Van Driver 
Fire Code Enforcement Officer 
MEO 
Account Clerk/Typist 
Account Clerk 
Principal Typist 
Senior Account Clerk 
Parking Enforcement Officer 
Assistant Building Inspector 
Code Enforcement 
Assessment Clerk 
Typist 
Mechanic 
Gate Keeper - Transfer Station 
- 1 -
Excluded: Town Supervisor 
Deputy Town Supervisor 
Town Councilmen 
Highway Superintendent 
Deputy Highway Superintendent 
Town Administrator 
Town Justice(s) 
Town Attorney(s) 
Assistant Town Attorney(s) 
Secretary to Town Supervisor 
Comptroller 
Department Head of Building Department 
Department Head of Planning 
• Department Head of Parks and Facilities 
• Department Head of Recreation 
Chief Court Clerk 
Assistant Highway Maintenance Supervisor 
Chief Special Police 
Assistant Highway Maintenance Supervisor 
Chief Special Police 
Court Clerks 
Assessor 
Receiver of Taxes 
Payroll Specialist 
Constable 
Environmental Specialist 
Director of Community Development 
Town Clerk 
Transfer Station Supervisor 
Animal Control Officer 
Seasonal Employees 
- 2 -
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and:, _ CASE NO.__.C-42.62 
COUNTY OF ALLEGANY AND ALLEGANY 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
ALLEGANY COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
Certification C-4262 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time employees of Allegany County 
Sheriffs' Department, including cook, clerk, 
correction officer, deputy sheriff, Ch DS and 
Sergeant. 
Excluded: Part-time, temporary, managerial, confidential 
...... and seasonal employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
rperson aline R. Kinsella, Chai 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
^y~ Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SULLIVAN COUNTY PATROLMAN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4266 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN AND SULLIVAN COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
CSEA, INC. LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sullivan County Patrolman's 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4266 - 2 -
Unit: Included: All full-time provisional and permanent 
employees in the titles of deputy sheriff, 
deputy sheriff corporal, deputy sheriff 
sergeant, deputy sheriff lieutenant, civil 
deputy, civil deputy corporal, civil deputy 
sergeant. 
Excluded: Sheriff, undersheriff, chief deputy sheriff, 
assistant chief deputy sheriff, confidential 
secretary to... the. sheriff, and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Sullivan County Patrolman's 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
vr-A J_\\^\\< 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
^^C^C^C^c 
Eric/J1. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4273 
WAYNE COUNTY AND WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFFS EMPLOYEES' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wayne County Sheriffs 
Employees' Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4273 page 2 
Unit Included: Criminal Investigator, Sergeant, Deputy, 
Corrections Officer, Dispatcher, Public Safety 
Dispatcher Supervisor, Court Attendant, Court 
Security Officer, Court Security Supervisor, 
Account Clerk (Civil), Sr. Account Clerk, 
Records Clerk, Sr. Records Clerk. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Chief Deputy, 
Lieutenants 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wayne County Sheriffs 
Employees' Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
rperson Pauline R. Kinsella,' Chai 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J/Schmertz,Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORRECTION OFFICERS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION OF ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO.C-4287 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND and ROCKLAND COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS, A DIVISION OF 
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Correction Officers 
Benevolent Association of Rockland County has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
Certification - C-4287 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Correction Officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Correction Officers 
Benevolent Association of Rockland County. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
t± 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Walter^L. Eisenberg, Member 
Erd/6 J . S c h m e r t z , Memlser 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ULSTER POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4289 
TOWN OF ULSTER, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Ulster Policemen's 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-4289 
- 2 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time police officers and 
dispatchers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Captain & Lieutenant. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Ulster Policemen's 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pau rperson iline R. Kinsella, Chai 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
QUEENSBURY SCHOOL SUPERVISORS OF CUSTODIANS 
AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, 
... .. - Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4083 
QUEENSBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Queensbury School 
Supervisors of Custodians and Maintenance Personnel has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Supervisor of Building Operations and 
Maintenance, Building Supervisor and Chief 
Maintenance Mechanic. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Queensbury School 
Supervisors of Custodians and Maintenance Personnel. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with.respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 1994 
Albany, New York 
m^s ihJt 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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N E W YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
8 0 WOLF ROAD JOHN M. GROTTY 
A L B A N Y , N E W Y O R K 1 2 2 0 5 DEPUTY CHAIRMAN 
( 5 1 8 ) 4 5 7 - 2 6 1 4 AND 
C O U N S E L 
M E M O R A N D U M 
September 23, 1994 
TO: The Board 
FROM: John M. Crotty 
RE: Rule Changes 
The following are proposed rule changes submitted after 
discussions with the representation staff and meetings with the 
Director and Chair. 
§201.2(b) 
Proposal 
[Notwithstanding section 201.4 of this Part, a] A 
petition may be filed at any time by a public employer 
or a recognized or certified employee organization to 
clarify whether a [new or substantially altered] 
position is encompassed within the scope of an existing 
unit, (hereafter called a unit clarification petition), 
or to determine the unit placement of a [new or 
substantially altered] position (hereafter called a 
unit placement petition). [A unit clarification 
petition may be filed either upon the consent of the 
parties or upon a showing that petitioner could not 
have filed a timely petition pursuant to section 201.3 
of this Part. A unit placement petition may only be 
filed upon a showing that petitioner could not have 
filed a timely petition pursuant to section 201.3 of 
this Part.] The filing and processing of the petition 
shall be in accordance with sections 201.5(c), 201.7(a) 
and (d), 201.8, 201.9(a)-(f) and 201.11 of this Part. 
Section 201.4 of this Part shall not apply. In 
^ J printed on recycled paper 
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determining the unit placement of [any new or 
substantially altered] a position, the director shall 
consider whether the placement would be consistent with 
the criteria set forth in section 207 of the act. The 
director may decline to make any clarification or 
placement not otherwise consistent with the purposes or 
policies of the act. Exceptions to any determination 
of the director may be filed pursuant to section 201.12 
of this Part. 
This rule change is intended to permit petitions adjusting 
the composition of an existing unit to be filed at any time by 
the parties to an existing bargaining relationship. All of the 
purposes served by the former §201.2(b) would be undisturbed by 
the amendments, which are intended to broaden those existing 
uses. The section would apply unless the petition raised an 
issue concerning the incumbent union's continuing majority 
status. If majority status were placed in issue, a 
certification/decertification petition would have to be filed 
under §201.3(d), as is currently the case. It is anticipated 
that §201.2(b) as amended would be used primarily to add 
unrepresented employees to an existing unit. Under the Board's 
A recent decision in New York Convention Center Operating 
- Corporation, that type of petition will not usually result in a 
question of majority status. An alternative mechanism is 
provided under existing §201.3(d) if majority status were placed 
in issue. Majority status questions would be presented in the 
context of a certification/decertification petition whether or 
not the unrepresented employees hold newly created or 
substantially altered positions. Majority status, therefore, 
replaces the concept of "newly created or substantially altered" 
as the factor defining the type of petition which may be filed; 
I §2 01.2(b) when there is no majority status issue; §201.3(d) when 
there is. 
§201.3(a) 
A petition for certification may be filed between 30 
and [60] 120 days after a public employer has been 
asked to recognize an employee organization, if the 
request has not been denied and no employee 
organization has been recognized or certified as a 
majority representative of any of the employees within | the unit alleged to be appropriate; provided, however, 
: that the petition may be filed by the public employer 
within such 3 0 days. Unless filed by a public 
employer, such a petition shall be supported by a 
showing of interest of at least 3 0 percent of the 
J employees within the unit alleged to be appropriate. 
This rule allows a union seeking recognition to afford an 
employer more time to come to a decision as to whether to extend 
recognition. 
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§201.5(e) 
Notice of filing of application. Any party filing a 
petition for certification or a petition under 
§201.2(h) of this Part, which seeks a review of a 
managerial or confidential designation made pursuant to 
§201.10 of this Part, shall, simultaneously with the 
filing, mail notice thereof to each managerial or 
confidential designee named in the petition and state 
in writing to the director that it has mailed the 
notice of filing in accordance with this section. The 
notice shall include the date the petitioner filed the 
petition with the director and a copy of the petition 
and such attachments thereto as pertain to the named 
designee. 
This rule is intended to give designated M/C employees 
notice of a petition which would effectively remove the 
designation and some information concerning the nature of that 
petition. 
§201.9(a)(1) 
Investigation. Subsequent to the filing of the 
petition the director shall direct an investigation of 
all questions concerning representation including if 
applicable whether the showing of interest requirement, 
as set forth in §§201.3 and 201.4 of this part, has 
been met; whether more than one employee organization 
seeks to represent some or all of the employees in the 
allegedly appropriate unit; and whether there is 
agreement among the parties as to the appropriateness 
of the alleged unit[;]^_ [and whether the parties wish 
the negotiating representative to have exclusive rights 
of representation.] 
This amendment is required because exclusivity is now 
granted by §204.2 of the Act upon recognition or certification. 
§201.9(g) 
Action By Director. After completion of the 
investigation or hearing, as the case may be, or upon 
the consent of the parties, the director shall [issue a 
decision which may direct an election or otherwise] 
dispose of [the matter] the question of representation. 
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§201.9(g)(1) 
§201.9(g)(1) Certification Without an Election. If 
the choice available to the employees in a negotiating 
unit is limited to the selection or rejection of a 
single employee organization, that choice may be 
ascertained by the Director on the basis of dues 
deduction authorizations and other evidences instead of 
by an election. In such a case, the employee 
organization involved will be certified without an 
election if a majority of the employees within the unit 
have indicated their choice by the execution of dues 
deduction authorization cards which are current, or by 
individual designation cards which have been executed 
within six months prior to the date of the director's 
decision recommending certification without an 
election. The determination by the director that the 
indications of employee support are not sufficient for 
certification without an election is a ministerial act 
and will not be reviewed by the board. The director 
shall inform all parties in writing if the director 
determines that the indications of employee support are 
sufficient for certification without an election. The 
director's determination in this respect is reviewable 
by the board pursuant to a written objection to 
certification filed with the board by a party within 
five working days of its receipt of the director's 
notification. An objection to certification shall set 
forth all grounds for the objection with supporting 
facts and shall be served on all parties to the 
proceeding. A response to the objection may be filed 
within five working days of a party's receipt of the 
objection. A copy of any response shall be served on 
all other parties. Section 2 01.12 of this part shall 
not otherwise apply except paragraphs (b)(1) and (h) 
thereof. 
This amendment is intended to speed the certification 
process in cases involving certification without an election. 
These cases are not usually contested and there is no need to 
subject the Director's determination recommending certification 
to the full range of procedures governing exceptions under 
§201.12. 
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§201.9(h)(2) 
[Within five working days after a final tally of 
ballots has been furnished, any] Any party may file 
with the director an original and four copies of 
objections to the conduct of [the] an election or 
conduct affecting the results of the election[.] within 
five working days of its receipt of a final tally of 
ballots. Such objections shall contain a [short 
statement of the reasons therefor.] clear and concise 
statement of the facts constituting the bases for the 
objection, including the names of the individuals 
involved and the time and place of occurrence of each 
particular act alleged. The objections shall be in 
writing and be signed and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths. Copies of such 
objections shall simultaneously be served upon each of 
the other parties by the party filing them, and proof 
of service shall be filed with the director. 
§201.9(h)(3) 
An answer [may] shall be filed within five working 
days [from service] after receipt of the objections. 
One copy of the answer shall be served on each party 
and the original, with proof of service and four 
copies, shall be filed with the director. The answer[, 
if submitted,] shall contain a [concise statement of 
facts in refutation of the objections.] specific 
admission, denial or explanation of each allegation of 
the objection and a clear and concise statement of any 
other relevant facts. The original shall be signed and 
sworn to before any person authorized to administer 
oaths. 
If a party fails or refuses to file a required 
answer, such failure or refusal may be deemed to 
constitute that party7s admission of the material facts 
in the objections and a waiver by that party of a 
hearing. 
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§201.9(h)(4) 
If objections are filed to the conduct of the 
election or conduct affecting the results of the 
election, or if challenged ballots are sufficient in 
number to affect the results of the election, the 
director shall investigate such objections or 
challenges, or both, and shall [prepare a decision.] 
take the appropriate action. The director may prepare 
a decision, or direct a hearing in accordance with the 
provisions of section 201.9(b)-(e) of this Part. 
These amendments to the election objection procedures are 
intended to codify certain existing practices and case law 
interpretations and to require a greater specificity of objection 
and response. 
§201.11 
Upon completion of proceedings, the director shall 
issue a decision and submit the record of the case to 
the board. The record shall include the petition or 
application, notice of hearing, motions, rulings, 
orders, stenographic report of the hearing, 
stipulations, exceptions, documentary evidence, any 
briefs or other documents submitted by the parties, 
objections to the conduct of an election or conduct 
affecting the results of an election, and the decision 
of the director. Briefs may be filed within such time 
and upon such terms as the director or the assigned 
administrative law judge may direct. Reply or 
supplemental briefs, however denominated, will not be 
permitted without prior request to and approval by the 
director or the assigned administrative law judge who 
shall fix the conditions for submission if approved. 
§204.8 
Any party shall be entitled upon request made before 
the close of a hearing conducted by an administrative 
law judge designated by the director, to file an 
original and four copies of a brief or proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, or both, 
within such time as fixed by the administrative law 
judge. The administrative law judge may direct the 
filing of briefs when the submission of briefs is 
warranted by the nature of the proceeding or the 
particular issue therein. Any such brief or proposed 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law filed with the 
administrative law judge must be accompanied by proof 
of service of a copy thereof upon all other parties. 
Reply or supplemental briefs, however denominated, will 
not be permitted without prior request to and approval 
by the administrative law judge who shall fix the 
conditions for submission if approved. 
§206.7(a) 
After completion of the hearing, or upon the 
consent of the parties, the administrative law judge, 
if any, shall submit the case, including his or her 
report and recommendations, to the board. The record 
shall include the charge, notice of hearing, motions, 
rulings, orders, stenographic report of the hearing, 
stipulations, exceptions, documentary evidence and any 
brief or other documents submitted by the parties. The 
board shall cause the report and recommendations of the 
administrative law judge, if any, to be delivered to 
all parties to the proceeding. Briefs may be filed by 
any party within seven working days after receipt of 
the report and recommendations of the administrative 
law judge, if any; provided, however, that the board 
may extend the time during which briefs may be filed 
because of extraordinary circumstances. An original 
and four copies of the briefs shall be filed with the 
board. Reply or supplemental briefs, however 
denominated, will not be permitted without prior 
request to and approval by the board which shall fix 
the conditions for submission if approved. 
The amendments in 201.11, 204.8 and 206.7(a) are intended to 
establish a uniform briefing policy. 
Part 211 Subpoenas 
§211.1 Scope. fa) The following relates to the 
issuance of subpoenas to compel the attendance of a 
person to testify at a hearing conducted by the board 
or a designee of the board on behalf of a party who is 
not represented by an attorney of record, subpoenas 
duces tecum requiring the production of books, records 
or documents from a municipal corporation or the state, 
or subpoenas duces tecum on behalf of a party who is 
not represented by an attorney. 
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(b) Nothing contained herein shall in any way affect 
the right of any person or entity to issue a subpoena 
pursuant to law. 
§211.2 Issuance of Subpoenas. All agency subpoenas 
shall be issued by and at the discretion of the 
presiding administrative law nudge. The administrative 
law nudge may grant or deny any subpoena reguest in 
whole or in part. Requests for a subpoena made within 
ten working days of a scheduled hearing will not be 
considered absent good cause shown by the party 
requesting the subpoena. 
§211.3 Request for Subpoena. (a) The administrative 
law judge shall issue a subpoena only when the party 
applying for it submits to the administrative law nudge 
a written affidavit of necessity. 
(b) Contents of affidavit for a witness subpoena. Such 
affidavit must specify: (1) the name and address of 
each individual for whom the subpoena is sought; and 
(2) facts sufficient to establish the relevancy of the 
testimony to be adduced pursuant to the subpoena. 
(c) Contents of affidavit for subpoena duces tecum; 
response. Such affidavit must specify: (1) the books, 
papers or other materials to be produced pursuant to 
the subpoena; (2) facts sufficient to establish the 
relevancy of the documents to be produced; and (3) that 
a copy of the subpoena request and affidavit has been 
served upon all other parties. The person or entity to 
whom or which the subpoena duces tecum is to be 
directed may file with the administrative law judge a 
response to the subpoena reguest, with copy to all 
other parties, within five working days of its receipt 
of the subpoena request. 
§211.4 Service of Subpoena. (a) The administrative 
law judge shall notify all parties as to the 
disposition of any subpoena request and shall furnish 
the party requesting the subpoena a completed subpoena 
form if the request has been granted in any respect. 
(b) Service of the subpoena and the payment of 
appropriate witness fees shall be the responsibility of 
the reguesting party. Service shall be made as 
required by law. 
/ 
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§211.5 Time and Place for Production of Documents. 
The administrative law judge may direct that any books, 
papers, documents or other objects ordered pursuant to 
this part be produced at a time or date prior to the 
hearing or prior to the time they are to be offered in 
evidence. The administrative law judge may, upon 
production of the documents, permit any party to 
inspect them prior to the scheduled hearing. 
§211.6 Motion to Quash. (a) Any individual who has 
been served with a subpoena or any party may file a 
motion with the administrative law judge, on notice to 
all parties, to guash any subpoena issued pursuant to 
this part. 
(b) Any such motion must be made promptly after the 
issuance of the subpoena so as not to interfere with 
the processing of the case. 
(c) The administrative law judge upon motion or 
reconsideration may quash or modify a subpoena issued 
pursuant to this Part for good cause shown. 
§211.7 Failure to Honor a Subpoena. (a) If a party or 
witness fails without reasonable excuse to comply with 
a subpoena properly served, the default shall be noted 
in the record. (b) The administrative law judge may, 
in his or her discretion, adjourn all or part of the 
hearing to allow the party who has requested the 
subpoena a reasonable opportunity to obtain compliance 
with the subpoena in accordance with applicable law. 
The administrative law judge may also strike from the 
record the pleadings and/or any testimony offered on 
behalf of such party at the hearing, may strike those 
portions of the testimony which are related to the 
matter called for in the subpoena or may take such 
other action as is appropriate. 
Part 211 is new. In many respects, it codifies existing 
policy and practice. The major change is that requests for 
subpoenas duces tecum will be decided by the ALJ, not the Chair. 
I have been persuaded that the Chair is not required by law to 
issue subpoenas duces tecum and I believe that the issuance of 
subpoenas should rest with the ALJ-?s subject to such appeal as i 
appropriate. Provisions have been added regarding notions to 
quash and consequences for noncompliance in clarification of 
agency policy. 
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§205.3 
5205.3 Compulsory interest arbitration; scope. The 
following relates to impasses in collective 
negotiations between those public employers and public 
employees covered by the provisions of §209.4 of the 
Act. 
This amendment merely clarifies and simplifies the existing 
provision. 
§205.6(b) 
Charge. The proposed arbitration of any matter set 
forth in the petition or response may be objected to by 
either party as being violative of §2 09-a.l(d) or 
§209-a.2(b) of the Act by filing an improper practice 
charge pursuant to §204.1 of this chapter. Section 
204.1(b)(4) of this chapter shall not apply. [The 
matter shall be accorded expedited treatment.] If 
filed by the respondent, such a charge [may not] must 
be filed [after the date of the filing of the response 
filed in accordance with section 205.5 of this Part;] 
within ten working days of its receipt of the petition 
requesting arbitration; if filed by the petitioner, 
such a charge [may not] must be filed [more than] 
within ten working days [after] of its receipt of the 
response. 
This amendment is intended to clarify existing language. 
§§205.8 & 205.19 
2 05.8 Conduct of the Arbitration Proceeding. The 
conduct of the arbitration [panel] proceeding shall be 
under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the 
arbitration panel. The conduct of the arbitration 
panel shall conform to applicable law. 
205.19 Conduct of the Arbitration Proceeding. The 
conduct of the arbitration [panel] proceeding shall be 
under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the 
arbitration panel. The conduct of the arbitration 
panel shall conform to applicable law. 
These amendments merely conform the language to the intent. 
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§205.10 
Compulsory Interest Arbitration Pursuant to §2 09.5 and 
§209.6 of the Act. The following relates to impasses 
in collective negotiations between the New York City 
Transit Authority and Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority and their subsidiaries and recognized or 
certified employee organizations covered by the 
provisions of §209.5 of the Act[.] and the New York 
City School Construction Authority and recognized or 
certified employee organizations covered by the 
provisions of §209.6 of the Act. 
This amendment merely extends existing interest arbitration 
procedures to the Construction Authority. The Authority is 
subject to compulsory interest arbitration, but we did not have 
any implementing rules. 
New Proposals 
§201.10(b) 
Time for filing of applications. An application may be 
filed [from the first day of the fourth month through 
the last day of the fifth month of the fiscal year of 
the public employer;] at any time; provided, however, 
that with respect to any persons who are in a unit for 
which an employee organization has been recognized or 
certified, only one application which has been 
processed to completion may be filed during a period of 
unchallenged representation status. 
This change is consistent with the amendments to §201.2(b) 
which lifted the restrictions on filing periods for petitions 
seeking to alter the composition of units. The open M/C filing 
periods should not be administratively inconvenient for us. The 
statutorily prescribed effective date of any designations is not 
affected by the rule change. 
§201.4 
(b) In determining whether the evidence submitted to 
establish a showing of interest is timely, the director 
will accept evidence of dues deduction authorizations 
which have not been revoked, evidence of current 
membership, original designation cards or petitions 
which were signed and dated within six months of the 
-12-
submission, or a combination of the three. Designation 
cards shall be submitted in alphabetical order. 
Any showing of interest consisting of individually 
signed and dated petitions shall be submitted on a form 
prescribed by the director which shall include the name 
of the petitioner, the unit alleged by the petitioner 
to be appropriate, and shall represent that the showing 
of interest is in support of the certification and/or 
decertification petition as applicable. 
The Director may require that an alphabetized listing 
of the names of the signators on individually signed 
and dated petitions be filed within a reasonable period 
of time after submission of the showing of interest 
petitions. If such an alphabetized listing is 
required, the person or persons filing the listing 
shall simultaneously file with the director a signed 
attestation that the listing sets forth only the names 
of the signators on the showing of interest petitions. 
This amendment reflects the belief that a showing of 
interest submitted in the form of petitions signed by unit 
employees vary too greatly in their content and often do not 
support the certification or decertification of any employee 
organization. This amendment, while still permitting 
individually signed petitions as a showing of interest, will 
promote more uniformity through the use of a form and will ensure 
that the indications of employee support are truly in support of 
the purpose(s) of the representation petition. 
§201.4(d) 
A declaration of authenticity, signed and sworn to 
before any person authorized to administer oaths, shall 
be filed by the petitioner or movant with the director 
simultaneously with the filing of the showing of 
interest or any evidence of majority status for the 
purpose of certification without an election, pursuant 
to section 201^9(g)(l) of this Part. Such declaration 
of authenticity shall contain the following: 
(1) the name of the individual executing the 
declaration, and a statement of the declarant's 
authority to execute it; if on behalf of an employee 
organization, the declarant's position with the 
employee organization, and a statement of the 
declarant's authority to execute the declaration on its 
behalf; and 
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(2) a declaration that, upon the declarant's personal 
knowledge, or inquiries that the declarant has made, 
the persons whose names appear upon the evidence 
submitted have themselves signed such evidences on the 
dates specified thereon, [and] the persons specified as 
current members are in fact current members[.] and that 
inquiry was made of all signators to the evidence 
submitted regarding their inclusion in any existing 
negotiating unit which is the subject of the 
representation petition. If the declaration is upon 
inquiries the declarant has made, the declarant shall 
specify the nature of those inquiries. 
This amendment is intended to strengthen the existing 
declaration of authenticity. 
New §201.12(d) 
A party filing exceptions, cross-exceptions, response 
or any other pleading authorized under this section 
shall include in its proof of service the date of that 
party's receipt of the paper, ruling, order or decision 
which is the subject of the party's filing and the date 
and method of that filing. 
This rule amendment is intended to provide parties with 
information which will better enable them to assess the 
timeliness of a filing. Existing subsections (d) through (h) 
would be relettered. 
§201.12 
(c) Within seven working days after receipt of 
exceptions, any party may file with the board an 
original and four copies of a response thereto, or 
cross-exceptions and a brief in support thereof, 
together with proof of service of a copy thereof upon 
each party to the proceeding. If a party elects not to 
file a response or cross-exceptions, then within the 
time permitted for those purposes the party shall file 
with the board and serve upon all other parties a 
written acknowledgement of receipt of exceptions and a 
statement of intent not to file a response or cross 
exceptions. Within seven working days after receipt of 
cross-exceptions, any party may file an original and 
four copies of a response thereto, together with proof 
of service of a copy thereof upon each party to the 
proceeding. No pleading other than exceptions, cross-
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exceptions or a response thereto will be accepted or 
considered by the board unless it is requested by the 
board of filed with the board's authorization. Such 
additional pleadings will not be requested or 
authorized by the board unless the preceding pleading 
properly raises issues which are material to the 
disposition of the matter for the first time. If any 
additional pleading is requested or authorized by the 
board, the board shall notify the parties regarding the 
conditions under which that pleading will be permitted. 
This rule is intended to expedite the Board's processing of 
cases by enabling it to establish a ready date with certainty and 
more quickly in circumstances in which there will not be any 
response or cross-exceptions to exceptions. 
§204.10 
(b) The exceptions shall: 
(1) set forth specifically the questions of procedure, 
fact, law, or policy to which exceptions are taken; 
(2) identify that part of the administrative law 
judge's decision and recommended order to which 
objection is made; 
(3) designate by page citation the portions of the 
record relied upon; [and] 
(4) state the grounds for exceptions. An exception to 
a ruling, finding, conclusion or recommendation which 
is not specifically urged is waived. 
(5) set forth the date of that party's receipt of the 
paper, ruling, order or decision which is the subject 
of the exceptions and the date of and method by which 
the exceptions were filed. 
This amendment corresponds to the amendment proposed in 
§201.12(d). 
-15-
204.11 Cross-exceptions; responses; replies. 
Within seven working days after receipt of exceptions, 
any party may file an original and four copies of a 
response thereto, or cross-exceptions and a brief in 
support thereof, together with proof of service of 
copies of these documents upon each party to the 
proceeding. Within seven working days after receipt of 
cross-exceptions, any party may file an original and 
four copies of a response thereto, together with proof 
of service of a copy thereof upon each party to the 
proceeding. No pleading other than exceptions, cross-
exceptions or a response thereto will be accepted or 
considered by the board unless it is requested by the 
board of filed with the board's authorization. Such 
additional pleadings will not be requested or 
authorized by the board unless the preceding pleading 
properly raises issues which are material to the 
disposition of the matter for the first time. If any 
additional pleading is requested or authorized by the 
board, the board shall notify the parties regarding the 
conditions under which that pleading will be permitted. 
A party filing cross-exceptions or a response shall 
include in its proof of service the date of that 
party's receipt of the paper, ruling, order or decision 
which is the subject of the party's filing and the date 
and method of that filing. If a party elects not to 
file a response or cross-exceptions, then within the 
time permitted for those purposes the party shall file 
with the board and serve upon all parties a written 
acknowledgement of receipt of exceptions and a 
statement of intent not to file a response or cross 
exceptions. 
These amendments correspond to and serve the same purposes 
as those in §201.12(c) and (d). 
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PROPOSED 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Text of Proposed Rules: 
1. A new section 204.15 is adopted to read as follows: 
204.15 Application for injunctive relief. (a) Filing of application. A 
party that has filed an improper practice charge may apply to the board for 
injunctive relief by filing with the director at the board's Albany office 
an original and two copies of an application for injunctive relief pursuant 
to section 209-a.4 of the act. The application shall be filed on a form 
prescribed by the board and shall be signed and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths. The application shall not constitute any 
part of the underlying improper charge and shall not be considered by the 
director in reviewing the charge pursuant to section 204.2 of this Chapter 
to determine whether the facts as alleged in the charge may constitute an 
improper practice. 
(b) Contents of application. An application for injunctive relief shall 
include the following: 
(1) the name, address, telephone number, fax number, and affiliation, if 
any, of the charging party; 
(2) the name, title, address, telephone number, and fax number of any 
representative filing the application on behalf of the charging party; 
(3) the name, address, telephone number, and fax number of the respondent 
or respondents, and any other party named in the improper practice charge; 
(4) the subsections of sections 209-a.l or 209-a.2 of the act that the 
charging party alleges have been violated; 
(5) an affidavit or affidavits stating, in a clear and concise manner, 
•.hose facts personally known to the, deponent that constitute the alleged 
.-improper practice, the date of the alleged improper practice, the precise 
nature of the injury, loss, or damage arising from it, and the date when 
the alleged injury, loss, or damage occurred or will occur; 
(6) a statement why the alleged injury, loss, or damage will render a 
resulting judgment on the merits of the improper practice charge 
ineffectual if injunctive relief is not granted by the court, and why there 
is a need to maintain or return to the status quo in order for the board to 
provide meaningful relief; 
(7) copies of any documentary evidence in support of the application; 
(8) a copy of the improper practice charge filed; 
(9) proof of personal service of the application on all parties to the 
improper practice charge; and 
(10) at the option of the charging party, a memorandum of law in support of 
the application for injunctive relief. 
Where an application for injunctive relief is not filed at the same time as 
the underlying improper practice charge, the copy of the charge submitted 
in support of the application shall bear the identifying number assigned to 
the charge by the director. 
2. A new section 204.16 is adopted to read as follows: 
204.16 Response to application for injunctive relief. (a) Filing of 
Response. A party served with an application for injunctive relief 
pursuant to section 204.15 of this Chapter may file with the counsel within 
five days of such service an original and two copies of a response to the 
application, with proof of service of a copy of the response on all 
parties. Alternatively, one copy of a response, with proof of service of a 
copy of the response on all parties, may be filed by fax at a telephone 
number designated by the board for.that purpose within five days of service 
of the application. If the response is filed by fax, the responding party 
shall mail or deliver an original and two copies of the response to the 
counsel by the next working day. The response shall be signed and sworn to 
before any person authorized to administer oaths and shall be deemed filed 
when received by the counsel. 
(b) Contents of Response. (1) The response, if any, shall assert any 
defense that the respondent, at the time of filing, believes it could 
rightfully assert in answer to the improper practice charge, including any 
affirmative defenses pursuant to section 204.3(c)(2) of this Chapter. The 
response shall not constitute an answer or responsive pleading to the 
improper practice charge pursuant to section 204.3 of this Chapter, and the 
assertion of any affirmative defense or other defense in the response shall 
not prejudice any party with regard to defenses or affirmative defenses 
that party may plead or not plead in an answer.or responsive pleading filed 
pursuant to that section. 
(2) Any affidavit submitted in support of the response shall be made on 
the basis of personal knowledge of the relevant facts and documentary 
evidence annexed to the affidavit. 
(3) The response may be accompanied by a memorandum of law in opposition 
to the application for injunctive relief. 
(c) Accelerated response. Upon presentation of clear evidence of a 
compelling need to obtain a determination of an application for injunctive 
relief in fewer than 10 days from its receipt by the board, and upon a 
determination by the counsel that such compelling need exists, the counsel 
may direct that a response, if any, shall be filed within a specified time 
earlier than otherwise required by this section. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Text of Proposed Rules: 
1. A new section 204.17 is adopted to read as follows: 
Section 204.17 Review of application for injunctive relief. (a) The 
determination whether the charging party has made a sufficient showing 
pursuant to section 209-a.4(b) of the act in an application for injunctive 
relief shall be made by the counsel. In making that determination, the 
counsel shall not be required to consider a response to an application for 
injunctive relief filed after the time prescribed pursuant to section 
204.16 of this Chapter. 
(b) Within 10 days of receipt of the application by the board, where a 
sufficient showing has been made, the counsel shall petition supreme court 
upon notice to all parties for injunctive relief or shall issue an order, 
with notice to all parties, permitting the charging party to seek 
injunctive relief by petition to supreme court. Where a sufficient showing 
has not been made, notice of that determination, stating the reasons for 
it, shall be issued by the counsel to all parties within 10 days of receipt 
of the application by the board. Orders permitting the charging party to 
seek injunctive relief by petition to supreme court and notices to the 
parties that a sufficient showing has not been made may be issued by fax. 
(c) Where the counsel elects to petition supreme court for injunctive 
relief, at the request of the counsel, the charging party shall assist the 
counsel in initiating and prosecuting the petition to supreme court and any 
rsxat.Su ^ earing, mccion, or appeal. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Text of Proposed Rules: 
1. A new section 204.18 is adopted to read as follows: 
Section 204.18 Expedited treatment where injunctive relief granted. 
Notwithstanding the time limits stated in sections 204.2, 204.3 and 204.6 -
of this Chapter, when injunctive relief is granted by a court pursuant to 
section 209-a.4 of the act, the administrative law judge assigned to the 
proceeding shall, after affording the parties an opportunity for 
consultation, issue a scheduling order or orders setting the dates and 
times for service and filing of answers and responsive pleadings, service 
and filing of motions and responses, conduct of a prehearing conference and 
hearings, and service and filing of briefs or proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Unless the parties mutually agree to waive the time 
limit for concluding the hearing and issuing a decision pursuant to section 
209-a.4(d) of the act, scheduling orders shall be fashioned in such a 
manner as to permit the administrative law judge to issue a decision on the 
merits of the improper practice charge within 60 days of the grant of 
injunctive relief. Sanctions for failure by any party to comply with any 
portion of a scheduling order shall be within the discretion of the 
administrative law judge. 
